Ceasefire Effort by Stakeholders in Mitigating Pastoralist Conflict between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi Northern Kenya
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Abstract

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to assess the mitigation measures of conflict in Baragoi since the pre-colonial period taking various paradigmatic shifts in intervention ranging from the traditional which involved the council of Elders to a contemporary initiative by the government and non-governmental organization. Despite varied modus operandis of conflict resolution, it should be noted that the milieu of a peaceful existence has been a cul-de-sac. It has become very elusive to circumnavigate the conflict experienced in conflict due to the salience tenets of the conflict. This study sought to analyze the ceasefire efforts put in place by the government.

Methodology: This study utilized protracted social conflict which focuses on the state's responsibility in ensuring that all community groups under its authority can satisfy their fundamental human requirements, including security and peace. The study utilizes historical research which formed the basis of tracing and identifying actors who have contributed to the intervention and mitigation of pastoralist conflict between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi Northern Kenya.

Findings: The study findings indicated that the government has been involved in disarmament, setting up camps, operations, and sensitization of the conflicting communities. Non-governmental organizations immensely contributed by establishment of boreholes, grassroots initiatives were noted especially the community itself, the council of elders and women.

Unique Contribution to Theory, Policy and Practice: The findings will be pertinent in strategizing approaches of intervention measures and mitigation especially this is in terms of strengthening the powers of council of elders. The government will be enlightened on importance of historical tracing for the purpose of intervention of conflict.

Keywords: Mitigation, Peacebuilding Intervention
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

According to Morgenthau (2007), the maintenance of peace has become the responsibility of all governments globally, with the United Nations adopting conflict avoidance as the ultimate goal. The United Nations General Assembly is utilized as an “open conscience of the world,” and public opinion is the most powerful of all peace forces (Morgenthau, 2007).

World public opinion transcends national boundaries, uniting people of many ethnicities in agreement on certain worldwide concerns. However, save for those norms of international law to which the national state has agreed, no rules of international law are binding on it. Other synonyms for sovereignty, such as independence, equality, and unanimity, impede the implementation of international law (Morgenthau, 2007).

Apart from using diplomatic initiatives to manage conflicts, the UNO dispatches peacekeeping missions and supervisors to affected parts of the world. Such initiatives have helped reduce poverty, hunger, starvation, diseases, and general helplessness in global communities (Morgenthau, 2007). However, the United Nations Armed Mission to Somalia (UN AMISOM) suffered a retaliation setback from Al-Shabaab when 76 World Cup Soccer finals viewers were killed in a Kampala Hotel on July 11th, 2010.

According to Fortna and Howard (2008), conflict interventions greatly enhance the chances of long-term peace. They would be more effective, though, if they concentrated more on state-building and grassroots conflict resolution. Peace procedures typically concentrate on the national and international levels, ignoring the root causes of conflicts. When constructing peace treaties, consideration should be paid to grassroots concerns; considerable funds should be allocated to local conflict resolution programs; and diplomatic and UNO staff employees should get bottom-up training. Peacebuilding programs should address the micro-level ethnic, political, religious, economic, and social divides.

Previous attempts at peace-making have concentrated on the surface causes of conflict between Turkana and Pokot nationalities; nevertheless, these issues are symptoms of a much larger systemic conflict model. One attempt at reconciliation focused on the people in the villages. The prohibition of plundered cattle being kept by the raiding actors was emphasized among pastoral communities. Women kidnapped during raids may also not be used as raiders’ brides (Krätli and Swift, 1999).

The Samburu pastoralists’ main socio-political organization and method for settling disputes is the council of elders. The Turkana and Pokot counterparts of the Tree of Men and the Kokwo, respectively, are these institutions. The council of elders consists of respected community elders, respective heads of the Nabos (neighborhood courts located within the Manyatta and always managed by senior elders), and representation from age groups and, to a lesser extent, older women (District Peace and Development Committees ‘TORs Harmonization Workshop, Report, June 2005).
Men (not morans) make decisions in the Samburu community, commonly under a tree designated as a council meeting place. Grazing patterns, peacekeeping with neighboring communities and internal/domestic issues are only some of the themes covered by these decisions, which are usually determined by consensus. Women generally sit in the outside circle and converse while holding green grass. Alternatively, a woman may not express herself publicly in open council but may do so through a male relative. Women, on the other hand, are free to convene their council meetings and then bring the results to the men’s council for consideration.

The Samburu District Peace Committee is made up of men and women from the district's various Nabos, notably at the sub-location level. By every metric, this committee has been successful in resolving disputes in the district, particularly when it employs Samburu conflict resolution traditions and customs (District Peace and Development Committees' TORs Harmonization Workshop, Report, June 2005). SDPDC has emerged as one of the most promising committees in the country while being one of the country’s youngest. Their structure, which is independent of the government, has been their greatest strength. As with sub-location committees, its membership is selected from traditional institutions. These studies were helpful in assessing the many peace initiatives that were employed, as well as their successes and failures; as a result, the study provided recommendations for future peace initiatives.

The committee comprises 20 members at the district level, with three members (an elder, a youth, and a woman) proposed by each division (Samburu district has six divisions). Two more members are chosen from the cosmopolitan Baragoi and Nyiro divisions, with a significant Turkana population. In the past, attempts by the division to restrict access to tiny weapons have failed miserably. Kenya takes a firm stand against the spread of small arms in the area. In most cases, these guns are illegal in the state. However, due to pastoral conflict, there is a loguincentive to keep the guns trade running. As a result, firearms are purchased from neighboring nations with more lax weapons laws. According to the Regional Centre for Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA), over 100,000 small arms and light weapons have already been destroyed (Mkutu, 2005). However, the efficiency of such programs is frequently questioned. Because of the high expenses of completing such comprehensive operations, the destruction of weapons is sometimes dependent on external financing sources. Because the government is not a shareholder in this situation, it has little incentive.

(Quam, 1999) posits that elders among the Karamoja decided on important issues through deliberations, and discussions, and averted violent conflicts through peaceful resolutions in their community. In Ethiopia, for instance, the village council and the village head (Aba-olla) among the Boran made important decisions touching on politics, and social and economic dimensions. The village council maintained peace solved conflicts, represented their village in 11 inter-village functions, and managed essential resources such as pasture and water points (Dzivenu, 2008).
According to Grahn and Akabwai (2005), collaborative methods cannot tackle systemic problems inside a dispute. Peacekeeping attempts on a larger scale have also run into difficulties. According to Mahmoud (2011), state-led peace-making attempts frequently fail to owe to corruption, a lack of legitimacy, a lack of resources, and, ultimately, institutional weakness. Attempts to mediate ethnic conflict aggravate social tensions in a government where ethnic politics are firmly ingrained (Mahmoud, 2011).

The necessity to equip local communities with tools to administer a legal framework and a bottom-up strategy to distribute legal knowledge and advocacy may offer local agencies. Through mutual blessings and increased interconnectedness, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) could be instrumental in providing agency and facilitating the cessation of mimetic violence. This approach is paired with that of ‘cost-cutting.’ In this case, parties compromise on problems when the expenses of doing so are lowered, frequently owing to compensation (Pruitt et al., 2003).

Conflict in pastoral regions is related to their peripheral position and little state penetration, according to (Mwaura 2005). Pastoralists are perceived as geographically remote and occupying outlying locations, as well as politically and culturally marginal. Their supposed remoteness from contemporary institutions and the state's regulating activity is sometimes taken as a self-evident reason for widespread violence. The issue is far more complicated and a deeper examination (as indicated above) reveals that the colonial and post-colonial state has had a direct role in worsening pastoral communities’ instability. Previous government approaches to insecurity in dry areas in Kenya, for example, have had many flaws: Lack of response. There has frequently been no response to "normal" killing and raiding; a certain degree of inter-clan or inter-ethnic slaughter within pastoral groups was commonly seen as normal and acceptable; Delayed response: District administrations have grumbled about delays in responding to insecurity in arid areas (Mwaura, 2005).

Flintan (2020) presents ways of preventing land use conflicts in pastoral areas. Project or program interventions that build the capacity of existing institutions to undertake improved natural resources and land governance are more likely to be successful than those that establish entirely new institutions. Existing pastoralist customary mechanisms can promote inter-community cooperation, collaboration, and negotiation. They are known to work best where there are no substantial power differences. They are also low cost, promote a consensus-building approach, and encourage community self-reliance. Customary institutions are normally understood to be best placed for resolving local conflicts, and often the government will support them in this role. However, customary institutions can have several weaknesses. Their patriarchal way of working can marginalize women, who may well benefit from decisions made, yet are often not part of the decision-making processes that led to those decisions. This goes against ideas of gender equality and equity. In some places, overall authority levels among pastoral customary institutions are also weakening because of societal changes in terms of wealth differences and greater ethnic
diversity within communities. Frequently, customary tenure systems have been overridden by statutory processes that do not match well with local land and resource use and for example, the landscape-level management required of pastoral systems. Community elite may use their positions for personal rather than collective gain. Defining effective and sustainable governance provides a valuable opportunity for collaboration and cooperation if issues such as ‘elite capture’ can be controlled. Establishing (negotiating) a shared vision helps to develop common positions and goals. Positive roles can be established for both customary and statutory governance structures, for example, the role of government as a credible enforcer of the law, and the role of customary leaders as custodians of natural resources, peacebuilders and local development agents. Other stakeholders such as development agencies or conflict dialogue facilitators may also have a role to play. In addition issues of gender equity will need to be considered and ways to ensure women as well as men in decision-making and management processes identified (Hemmati, 2012).

Mitigation by management of natural resources

The Borana social life is linked to access to deep wells through complex clusters of use rights (madaa) linked to consanguineal ties which are not territorially based. Development agencies have understood the Boran institution of madaa as a social unit for natural resource management. However, Helland (1994) shows that if madaa ties have served to limit natural resource exploitation such an effect should be seen as a by-product of Boran social organization and not as the function of madaa. The organization of water use for the Borana, Helland (1994) argues, is not primarily about resource management, but about maintaining peaceful relationships and the Boran way of life. Similarly, Bollig (1993) argues that the Pokot network of long-term reciprocal ties in which they are enmeshed, and which form the core of institutions that mediate access to resources, should be seen as one important factor in explaining intra-ethnic peace. Rirash (1992), in his analysis of Somali perceptions of conflict in traditional oral poetry, also underlines that it is the day-by-day practice of sharing resources that gives existence to brotherhood and social ties, and not the other way round.

Traditionally, the ability of the elder age-set to act as an effective conflict management institution relied on three main sources of authority: control of access to resources/marriage; being part of a large cross-clan, cross-ethnic, cross-generation network; supernatural legitimacy (Gulliver, 1951).

Statement of the Problem

Conflict in Baragoi has been experienced for more than a decade. During the pre-colonial period, the council of elders played important role in peace broker between the conflicting communities. In the contemporary period there have been increased mitigation measures by various stakeholders ranging from grass root initiative, NGOs, and Governmental organization. Various scholars such as (Paklya et al., 2003) have been involved in researching the mitigation measures
but none of them captures the historicity behind the actors of conflict resolution and subsequent failures. Therefore this created a lacuna filled by this study of an assessment mitigation and intervention measures put in place by the government.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study utilized protracted social conflict that was propounded by Azar which focuses on the state's responsibility in ensuring that all community groups under its authority can satisfy their fundamental human requirements which include security and peace. Azar observes that in nations where social conflict has lasted for a long time, political authority is dominated by one identity group that utilizes its resources to retain control over the other

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study utilized historical research which formed the basis of tracing and identifying actors who have contributed to the intervention and mitigation of pastoralist conflict between the Samburu and Turkana of Baragoi Northern Kenya. Data on the initiatives and failures of the stakeholders were collected through interview schedules and questionnaires. Data was analyzed thematically capturing important tenets of intervention measures and weaknesses pinpointed by the respondents.

Role of politicians in Mitigation of conflict during Moi’s Regime

On October 6th, 1980, Isaack Kipkorir Salat, Assistant Minister Office of the President, paid a visit to Samburu district. He condemned stock raids by the Ngorokos and informed a Baraza at Maralal that the Government had agreed to establish home guards in the District. Kenya African National Union KANU convened two public meetings at Maralal and Wamba (KNA/ACW/27/87).

Peter LotitioLekaikum MP Samburu West addressing the flocked hall appealed to all residents of Samburu District either in civil service or business people regardless of their origin but are living in the District that they should promote development. He stressed the need for Turkana and Samburu tribes to live in harmony. He further emphasized that anybody practicing tribalism will suffer consequences. (KNA/ACW/27/87).

Similarly, according to Azar, as explained, since the source of protracted social conflict lies in the struggle over human needs for security, identity, and social justice, problem-solving can be proposed as an initial step. Azar (1991) claimed that what is needed is a framework in which the parties can analyze and explore their perception of the origin and nature of protracted social conflict and realize that they are seeking similar needs such as recognition and security through adversarial tactics.

Peace-building projects had been created in the County by World Vision Kenya (WVK), the World Food Program (WFP), the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Organization (ACTED), and the International Medical Corps (IMC). These non-governmental organizations
focused on a participative collective approach to achieving peace and nonviolent coexistence. For example, the World Vision peace initiative began operations in 1997 to educate rival communities about the benefits of peaceful coexistence, provide formal education, and provide water by drilling boreholes and piping water from the highlands to the lowlands, as well as providing drought-resistant Sahiwal cattle breed.

To deal with pastoral conflicts, governments frequently send their troops and police to conduct violent cordon and search and seizure operations. Such crackdowns can amass large amounts of weaponry, increase insecurity for certain groups, and frequently fail to address the conflict's fundamental dynamics. Even ‘voluntary' disarmament exercises which elicited less opposition, are frequently carried out unilaterally. Recent attempts at disarmament among pastoralists in South Sudan, north-eastern Uganda, and north-western Kenya, which lacked mediation, conflict resolution, or development components, demonstrate this strategy's numerous obstacles and limits (Young, 2007).

**Peace Building Initiative**

Peace-building projects have been established in the county by World Vision Kenya (WVK) and the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS). The World Vision peace initiative, for example, began operations in 1997 to educate rival communities on the benefits of peaceful coexistence, provide formal education, provide water through borehole drilling and water piping from the highlands to the lowlands, and provide water to drought-resistant Sahiwal cattle breed. In 2010, the WVK launched a water project in Chepareria, West Pokot, and Kenya that delivered safe drinking water to almost 68,000 people (Triche, 2014). The Kenya Red Cross made the most significant effort by distributing food and non-food supplies to impacted areas. The supply of food resulted in a decrease in the frequency and severity of disputes. The Japan-funded project, (International Organization for Migration) focuses on conflict prevention, victim protection, policy development, and strengthening that promotes peaceful coexistence and fosters relationships with official and grassroots entities like peace committees in West Pokot County (IOM, 2011).

**Disarmament**

The presidential announcement that all the Pokot and Turkana who possess illegal firearms should surrender all such arms was received well by the Samburu people. The Samburu felt that the illegally possessed firearms to promote the existing inter-ethnic tension between them, the Pokot and the Turkana. They said that if the firearms were surrendered, the ethnic clashes would disappear and that the nomadic people involved would progress. The Samburu also said that if the Turkana were not willing to surrender their firearms, the situation will deteriorate, for they would believe that the government feared them. The same goes for the Pokot. Some Turkana said that the presidential order was biased against them, for some of them keep firearms for self-defense (KNA/ACW/27/87).
These sentiments concur with Azar’s theory that the state is provided with authority to govern and use force when necessary especially in disarming the Samburu and Turkana in the Baragoi area to maintain order and regulate society, for the protection of citizens combating conflict.

Disarming the two communities would be the best solution to minimize violent conflicts. However, this presents a significant challenge because other pastoralists in neighboring countries like Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan are also armed. Therefore, disarming the Turkana and the Pokot would make them vulnerable to these other pastoralists across the borders (Mkutu, 2005). Efforts to disarm in the 1980s were mainly reliant on the use of force. Despite this, just a few weapons were confiscated. Disarmament attempts in the past were selective and poorly organized, and they mostly failed, exacerbating inter-communal tensions (KNA/ACW/27/87). Onyango (2010) postulates that in the process, relationships with pastoral communities were badly harmed. This resulted in a change of tactics in 1995 when the government decided to provide amnesty to anybody who surrendered their firearms. Attempts to engage communities in conversation, as well as continual threats of force, were used to augment this strategy. Since 1995, there have been disarmament initiatives on this premise almost every year. Amnesty offers haven't resulted in a significant improvement in outcomes. The most recent disarmament effort took place between 2001 and 2002. Residents of West Pokot, Marakwet, and Baringo were given an ultimatum by the government to surrender their guns in return for amnesty. According to Pokot elders, it was impossible for the Pokot to survive without firearms, while their neighbors, such as the Karamojong of Uganda, were allowed to use guns (FGD Pokot Elders 17/8/2021, Tuum). The amnesty period came to an end with no arms retrieved. As a result, a public education effort to convince the Pokot to hand in their guns was initiated. Local leaders were employed in particular to teach their people about the need to hand in their weapons. Government threats to confiscate guns if cooperation was not forthcoming loomed in the background (Gitau, 2013).

**Opereshen Rudisha ng’ombe (Operation return cattle) in the Samburu community**

Only Turkana elders attended a conference held by a senior police officer on November 4th to review the progress of inter-communal discussion between Turkana and Samburu elders and notified the police of their willingness to return 12 additional heads of cattle (Okumu 2015). A respondent revealed that,

> On November 5th, 2012, at a meeting meant for handing over the animals by both groups, it was noted that inter-communal dialogue failed due to the failure of the elders from both sides to bring the stolen animals. It was then declared by the Samburu County Commissioner that an operation to recover the stolen animals be launched against the Turkana in Lomerok village. The operation dubbed “RudishaNg’ombe” thus targeted the Turkana village of Lomerok and ‘Return the Livestock’ completely ignored the Samburu raiders that had raided the 205 Turkana camels on October 29th, 2012 (O.I, Lentoimaga, 20/7/2021/ Suguta).
According to NPS (2013), there was a dispute among top police officials. The officer in charge of operation "RudishaNg'ombe" and the commander of police units in Samburu North (OCPD) opposed the operation's commencement. They said it targeted Turkana while ignoring Turkana complaints.

According to Okumu (2015), in his October 2014 study at Marti Center, Northern Kenyans have been denied security and prosperity by the Kenyan government. The absence of appropriate social services, such as schools and hospitals, demonstrates the inequality in development in Northern Kenya compared to other areas of Kenya. Pastoralists in Northern Kenya refer to their kin living and working in other regions of Kenya as "the ones living in Kenya" in local slang. Despite the fact that the state has improved security in Samburu North sub-County with police camps in Marti, Nachola, Tuum, South Horr, and Baragoi town, raids continue to take place in broad daylight, as happened on January 19th, 2012, at Baragoi Slaughter House, where Samburu raided Turkana goat herders and made off with 200 goats. On the same day, the Turkana reacted by raiding 95 goats from Samburu herders near Baragoi Mixed Secondary School. The fact that these raids took place just 700 meters from the Baragoi Police Station and the Administration Police's Baragoi Command Post demonstrates Samburu and Turkana fighters' audacity and faith in their ammo supply. It also demonstrates that police officials stationed in Northern Kenya still feel that raiding is part of pastoralist culture and that it is thus acceptable to allow it to continue.

The following KPRs from Parkati (including the chief) were disarmed as demonstrated in

**Table 1 Disarmament of KPR from Parakati**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KPR Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G3 serial number 005624</td>
<td>with ammunition belonging to Assistant Chief Parkati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKIV serial number N24652A</td>
<td>With nine rounds of ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPR in Parkati</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKIV serial number PF 401881</td>
<td>With five rounds of ammunition from a KPR officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3 serial number 97496391</td>
<td>With 81 rounds from a KPR officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKIV serial number U37347</td>
<td>With eight rounds of ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKIV serial number AA22028</td>
<td>With two rounds of ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKIV serial number 18545</td>
<td>With three rounds of ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MKIV serial number 13144</td>
<td>With five rounds of ammunition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The role of NGOs in Mitigating of conflict during Uhuru’s Regime

External Resolution Efforts: The Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) is conducting peace programs in Northern Kenya (Turkana, Marsabit, and Samburu) through the conflict management initiative (Pkalya et al. 2003). The study findings revealed that Turkana-Pokot-Samburu Pastors Cross-Border Conflict Management Initiative serves the Turkana, Pokot, and Samburu populations in three regions. The project began in 2010 to encourage and promote the three communities' adoption of procedures to settle their issues amicably and inspire resource sharing and happy coexistence (Mkutu, 2005). In addition, the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) has provided humanitarian aid to victims of a conflict between the Samburu and the Pokot (reliefweb.int). Peace efforts and conflict management skills from the Nairobi-based Shalom Centre for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (SCCRR) would also assist Kenya's pastoral communities of Turkana and Samburu. The institute would research peace-building and conflict resolution as well as provide training to locals.

Pastoralist Poverty Reduction Organization seeks to improve pastoralists' quality of life by encouraging self-sufficiency and providing necessary services, while Cross Currents Indigenous Network focuses on outreach, education, and social uplift. Norwegian Church Aid helps with disaster relief, rehabilitation, and development projects. The North Rift Women Pastoralist Association works to promote women's economic development and peacebuilding. The POKATUSA Peace and Development Program encourages pastoral communities to work together to create peace, reconciliation, and conflict resolution.

Failure by the Community itself

It was evident during the fieldwork that the conflict playing out in Baragoi is attributed mainly to the failure of the communities in question, in being honest in their pastoral activities and their refusal to give information to the government stakeholders. In 1980 Melei Michael, chairman of Samburu County Council, urged the Samburu and Turkana people whose cattle are raided by Ngoroko to be giving a meticulous number of raided cattle instead of giving exaggerated figures of raided livestock (KNA/ACW/27/87).

An informant noted that Turkana communities have deep-rooted hatred toward the Samburu. Accordingly we call them Ngor, and they call us tum (O.I, David Lengusuranga 2/7/202, Suyan). Those words are derogatory to the two communities. The informant
acknowledges that they have contributed by providing information on the location kraal where the bandits can raid cattle.

This is in line with the primordialism theory that states that the Samburu and Turkana conflict is due to deep-rooted hatred that can be traced to their ancestors. That feeling of identity exacerbates the community in question to protect and fight for their resources.

Turkana people living along the border of Loriu plateau continued to complain against Turkana Ngoroko’s harassment, but they do not like the police operation to hit Ngorokos. Therefore, they offered vague information that rendered the operation useless (KNA/ACW/27/89).

Interviews and focus group discussions in the field of threat response strategies reveal the following: Local interpretations from the most likely assault sites, Tuum, Loongerin, Parikati, and Sarima, show that informal out-group coping strategies and intra-group civic networks are important in controlling violence. Local civic groups, in particular, made a substantial contribution to the non-escalation of the situation. According to an insider, there is little trust between the Samburu and Turkana, and there is a constant fear of assault. Out of fear of eavesdropping and access to information about militia locations and resources, the Samburu do not allow Turkana from Parikati direct access to marketplaces in Tuum. The Catholic Church organizes tightly policed "Soko," or "peace markets," where livestock is traded between Parikati and Tuum or through middlemen who perform transactions in distant places between the two communities.

Samburu militia members believe the Turkana population in Parikati is planning to plunder Samburu cattle with the help of highly mobile Turkana or Pokot militants. Turkana in Parikati devised several methods to decrease the possibility of Samburu raiding the hamlet after a series of fatal invasions. Threat information is shared by a limited network of Turkana leaders in Parikati with sponsors of Samburu militants in Tuum. Due to a lack of communication technologies, Turkana rely on intra-clan trading networks to get information on hidden dangers. Turkana militants have killed actors found spying for Samburu militias; thus, this is a high-risk strategy, according to a witness:

The use of a clandestine informant network reduces the chances of a quick escalation. According to a local Samburu militia leader, “We still do not trust them at all. We would attack them if we knew they were working with other enemies, but as long as they share information with us, we cannot attack them (O.I Nachoko 11/12/2021 Baragoi).

To decrease the probability that Samburu may attack out-group communities, clandestine informant networks develop a minimal kind of cross-ethnic group connection. At the same time, covert inter-group information networks are supplemented by informal intra-group policing measures. Suppose Samburu suspects Turkana of creating an outside alliance to allow an
external Turkana or Pokot force to exploit the hamlet as a forward base for attacks. In that case, the delicate connection will fall apart. An informant said:

We do not let other Turkana or Pokot pass through Parikati, even just to trade. There are spies for the Turkana in Parikati and Tuum and spies for the Samburu in Parikati and Tuum. All of the spies want peace and to protect their animals; they tell each other if the other group is coming through their territory to attack. We do not want those who kill to be part of our community, so we keep them out (O.I, Lekishom, 23/7/2021 Baragoi).

The GoK’s NyumbaKumi (or "ten houses") Initiative encourages pastoralist groups in the area to engage in informal community policing. The GoK urges communities to create informal community watch systems to regulate the movement of possible spoilers into and out of settlements in the most unstable areas, modeled after communal policing institutions in Rwanda. Informant networks and intra-group policing are enhanced by livestock management methods. The Turkana community in Parikati, for example, created livestock identification and tracking systems for each clan and enacted a communal ordinance prohibiting animal purchases from unknown Turkana or Pokot marketplaces or dealers.

**Failure by the politicians to unite the people of Baragoi**

According to Okumu (2015), politicians were also accountable for the expulsion of the Samburu in Marti, who had long coexisted peacefully with their Turkana neighbors. Because of their unique bond, the Turkana and Samburu of Marti avoided the urge to betray one another by exchanging information about possible raids from other Turkana and Samburu villages in Samburu North Sub-County. However, a top Samburu politician intervened, providing vehicles and 500 Kenya Shillings to each Samburu household to facilitate their move to Morijo, allowing warriors from other Samburu villages like Suiyan and Ngilai to raid the Turkana of Marti.

The deterioration of traditional governance systems has created a power vacuum, which is progressively filled by political leaders and other power brokers who see the opportunity to renegotiate boundaries and land access. They have understood that ethnic mobilization has played a significant role in national political battles. These processes are carried out even in the most distant pastoralist communities, where competition for land is becoming increasingly ethicized. Livestock raiding emerges as a unique type of violent regulation in this context: a well-adapted, hazardous, and potent political weapon (Greiner, 2013).

Attempts to restrict access to small weapons have failed in the past. Kenya takes a tough stance against small arms proliferation in the area. Within the state, these firearms are mostly prohibited. However, pastoral conflict provides a local incentive to keep the arms trade going. As a result, guns are acquired from countries with more permissive weapons regulations. Over 100,000 small arms and light weapons have already been destroyed, according to the Regional Centre for Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) (Lamb and Dye 2009). However, the efficacy of
such programs is sometimes questioned. Because of the high expenses of executing such massive initiatives, the destruction of weapons is sometimes reliant on outside financing. Because the government is not a shareholder in this situation, it has no motivation to participate. Scholars have noted the ongoing cycle of illicit weaponry inflow and subsequent destruction (Lamb and Dye, 2009).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, various stakeholders such as the council of elders happen to be the most respected in the community of the Samburu and Turkana. Elders have contributed to resolving conflict and the administration of natural resources. Nongovernmental organizations have been involved in peace caravans. The government of Kenya has also tried to resolve to establish security camps in hotspots area for cattle raiding.

RECOMMENDATION

The government should support the indigenous peace institute such as the council of elders who engage in peacebuilding at the grassroots level. The stakeholders should enlighten society on the importance of positively enhancing their cultural practice. The government should provide funds to these (morans) young men to engage in meaningful economic activities such as agriculture and business. The peacebuilders should identify diviners and fortune-tellers (Lobon/ Ngimuurok) in the society they should be involved in peacebuilding. The government should ensure that the youth polytechnic should be established so that youth who are idling in the community can enrol and hence be preoccupied with expert knowledge and skills that will benefit them in the future and enable them to earn an income.
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KNA/ACW/27/87 (1979) Samburu District Intelligence Committee