Refugees and National Security in Kenya: A Case Study of Eastleigh, Kamukunji Constituency, Nairobi County

CARI

Refugees and National Security in Kenya: A Case Study of Eastleigh, Kamukunji Constituency, Nairobi County

Erick Ochieng Otieno

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Catholic University of Eastern Africa

P.O Box 62157 Bogani E Rd, Nairobi, Kenya

Corresponding Author email: eryket@gmail.com

Dr. Felistus Mwikali

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Catholic University of Eastern Africa

P.O Box 62157 Bogani E Rd, Nairobi, Kenya

Rev. Dr. Norvy Paul

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Catholic University of Eastern Africa

P.O Box 62157 Bogani E Rd, Nairobi, Kenya

Abstract

Purpose: This study is about refugees and national security in Kenya: Case Study of Eastleigh, Kamukunji Constituency, Nairobi County. The research examined whether refugees are a threat to national security, evaluated the relationship between refugees and terror activities and examined whether the Kenya's open-door policy on refugees is a threat to national security. This research was guided by conceptual framework on what national security is and threats to national security, as well as refugees and the security threats they pose to Kenya. Push and Pull Theory and Securitization Theory further guided the research.

Methodology: The study was conducted using Mixed Methods research design that incorporated both qualitative and quantitative approaches in data collection, data analysis and interpretation of the findings. The research instruments for data collection were questionnaire and one on one interviews with refugees and relevant key stakeholders such as UNHCR, Danish Refugee Council, and Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government. Secondary data was obtained from books, published scholarly materials, internet publications, field research report, theses, journals, government reports, newsletters, and newspapers.

Findings: The respondents indicated that there was a relationship between refugees and terror activities in Kenya. Majority of the respondents indicated that policies and laws were the best approaches in dealing with refugees related insecurity, thus effective policies, laws, and best approaches are required to stem the high levels of insecurity. Encampment policy did not provide

sustainable solution, majority of the respondents indicated that non-refoulement refugee policies and laws, refugee settlements, local integration, voluntary repatriation was a strategy and durable solutions in dealing with refugees and insecurity, while other respondents proposed expulsion of refugees involved in criminal activities and screening of refugees for security threats, as the best approaches in dealing with refugees related insecurity. Measures against errant refugees and regulation of border entries to prevent illegal and criminal immigrants was also proposed.

Unique contribution to theory, practice and policy: This research recommends that United Nations, World Bank, and IMF should facilitate peace keeping missions and strengthen the government institutions in countering displacements, with emphasis on resettlement and integration of refugees especially those who cannot return to their country of nationality. Approaches that foster peace and security, such as Nyumba Kumi initiatives led by the security agencies like Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, should continue to bring refugees, host community, development partners in both NGO and public sector and other stakeholders on board.

Key Words: *Refugees, Security Threats, Terror Activities, Open-Door Policy on Refugees and National Security*

Background of the Study

Refugees and asylum seekers are never far from international and domestic security discussions. Whether viewed as victims of security deficits or as potential threats to national or international security. Today, security has become a major issue on the international political agenda. United Nations, regional and international organizations, civil society organizations, bilateral cooperation, and all actors have realized that security is no longer limited only to the traditional view of protecting State borders and territories against external threats (Beyani, 2014). The first thing that comes to mind when national security is mentioned, is the safety of the State's citizens, if citizens are not safe from threats, especially threats from other nationals coming into their country then it is certainly not a secure country (Bell, 2012). National security now focuses on the citizens rather than the State. Traditionally, refugees were viewed as victims of insecurity, many scholars today view them as a core security problem, generally viewed as threat to national security rather than a humanitarian issue (Mogire, 2011). During the Cold War era, state borders, national interests and military threats dominated security discourse, this was traditional view of security as guided by the principles of the U.N Charter of 1945 that emphasized on state sovereignty, mutual coexistence, maintenance of international peace and security. This discourse failed to solve majority of the world's security concerns, especially many non-military threats, such as those arising from globalization and refugees. The discourse also assumed that threats arising from outside a state were more dangerous to its security than threats arising within (Ernst, 2020).

Globally, and in the last few decades, the world has witnessed a rise in the number of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (Clapier, 2015). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reports that there were 79.5 million forcibly displaced people worldwide because of persecution, conflict, violence, and human rights violations at the end of 2019. Of these 26 million are refugees, 45.7 million internally displaced, and 4.2 million asylum seekers. UNHCR estimates that more than half of the world's refugees reside in urban areas and less than third in camps (UNHCR Global Trends, 2019). The situation is the same in Africa, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees report that there were more than 10.5 million refugees in Africa at the end of 2016, and the number still increasing as many flee violent conflicts and political persecution. Sub-Saharan Africa host a large and growing number of refugees, constituting a 16% increase over 2015. Uganda experienced a dramatic increase in the refugee population in 2016. There were 477,200 refugees in Uganda; a number that nearly doubled to 940,800 a year later, most refugees came from South Sudan (639,000), the Democratic Republic of Congo (205,400), Burundi (41,000), Somalia (30,700), and Rwanda (15,200) (UNHCR Global Trends, 2016).

Refugees in Ethiopia also increased reaching 791,600 people, majority of refugees came from South Sudan (338,800), Somalia (242,000), Eritrea (165,600) and Sudan (39,900) (UNHCR Global Trends, 2016). Refugees have generated urgent concerns, they have created a mixture of humanitarian concerns and fear for the potential threat to national stability of host states (Elloitt, 2012). Kenya has been home to thousands of refugees from neighboring countries such as Somalia, South Sudan, and Uganda during the dictatorial rule of lddi Amin. The Dadaab refugee camps established in 1991 to host Somali refugees fleeing clashes and subsequent civil wars after the ousting of Said Barre in January 1991 have posed more security concerns to Kenya (Kirui, 2012). Insecurity in Kenya started with the establishment of Dadaab refugee camps in 1991, and especially with the influx of refugees who allegedly feared to be in possession of arms. Insecurity was accelerated by memories of the Shifta, (Somali word for bandit) and Somali militant movement in the 1960s that waged secession wars in Northeastern region supported by Mogadishu, Somalia's claim of an expanded Somali territory into Kenya's Northeastern region (Whittaker, 2012). Kenya host 491, 258 refugees, where 44% (217,532) hosted at Dadaab, 40% (193,941) hosted at Kakuma and 16% (79, 785) in urban areas of Nairobi. Majority of these registered refugees are Somalis, that is, 53% are Somalis, 25% South Sudanese, 9% Congolese, 6% Ethiopians, among other nationalities. Many Somali refugees flee violence associated with Al-Shabaab to the Dadaab camps of Ifo, Hagadera and Dhagahaley, and to urban areas of Eastleigh, Nairobi (UNHCR Kenya Operation Factsheet January, 2020).

In addition, there has been a steady movement of South Sudanese refugees into Kenya's Kakuma camp since the resumption of hostilities in South Sudan in December 2013. The new arrivals in 2014 surpassed its capacity by over 58,000 refugees leading to congestion. Negotiations between

UNHCR, the County Government of Turkana, the host community, and the National Government, assisted by identifying land in Kalobeyei, 20km from Kakuma town for the new settlement. Kakuma camp and Kalobeyei Integrated Settlement had a population of 196,666 registered refugees and asylum-seekers at the end of July 2020 (UNHCR Kenya Refugee Response Plan for South Sudanese, 2020). Kenyan government maintains an open-door asylum policy for new arrivals including from non-neighboring countries such as Eritrea, Burundi, and the Central African Republic. Before 1991, refugee regime in Kenya was more generous and hospitable, refugees in Kenya enjoyed full status rights, refugees could access educational opportunities, and the right to obtain work permit as well as the right to apply for legal local integration (Verdirame, 2015). However, around 1991 to 1992, political crises in Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia led to a large-scale influx of refugees into Kenya, which overwhelmed the capacity of Kenyan government's refugee protection, resulting in the handover of the responsibility of registration to the UNHCR and the withdrawal of Kenyan government from refugee affairs. After 1991, refugee regime has been less hospitable, with growing levels of xenophobia and few local integrations characterized by the growing national insecurity (Campbell, 2016).

Kenya experiences growing levels of terror activities, terrorism, radicalization, xenophobia, proliferation of small arms and weapons characterized by the growing national insecurity. Moreover, the Government still stands with the argument that refugee camps, especially Dadaab camps are used as a hideout and training ground for terrorists. This study, therefore, examined whether refugees are a threat to national security, evaluated the relationship between refugees and terror activities and examined whether the Kenya's open-door policy on refugees is a threat to national security. The study was carried out in Eastleigh, Nairobi, an area also known as "the little Mogadishu". Whenever terrorist attacks happen in Kenya, fingers point to this area as a place where terrorists hide, this follows a massive police manhunt for illegal immigrants, refugees, and suspects in this area mainly because the area is largely occupied by Kenyan Somalis and who are mainly Somali refugees.

Statement of the Problem

Terrorist attacks and terror activities are one of the most critical problems facing Kenya's national security. The main terrorism threat is from extremists linked to Al Shabaab; a militant group in Somalia opposed to the Somali government and has issued public threats against Kenya, due to Kenya's military intervention in Somalia (Kibor, 2016). The National Taskforce on Repatriation of Refugees from Dadaab Refugee Complex report cited that the Westgate Shopping Mall terrorist attack, Garissa University terrorist attack and the Lamu terrorist attack were "planned and coordinated" from the refugee camp (Taskforce report, 2016). This study outlines below some of the chronology of terror attacks in Kenya from 1980 to date (Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government Terrorism Report, 2017).

- 1980: Norfolk Hotel; linked to Israel-Palestinian conflict, 20 people killed and more than 100 people injured.

- 1998: US Embassy attack, 250 people killed and more than 5,000 injured.

- 2002: Paradise Hotel attack, 13 people killed and 80 injured.

- September 2011: Armed Somali men attacked a British couple at Kiwaiyu Safari village, killed the man and abducted the woman.

- October 2011: A French woman kidnapped by armed men in Manda Island and taken to Somalia.

- 24th October 2011: Hand grenade tossed into Mwauras night Club, injuring 14 people.

- 27th October 2011: A vehicle carrying Ministry of Education officials attacked in Mandera killing four people.

- 5th November 2011: Two people killed in a grenade attack at the Pentecostal Church in Garissa.

- 21st September 2013: Westgate Mall, Nairobi terrorist attack, killed 67 people and injured 175 others.

- 15th June 2014: Mpeketoni, Lamu terrorist attack, killed more 65 and injured several (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Occasional Report, 2014).

- 22nd November 2014: Terrorist attacked a Nairobi bound bus in Mandera killing 28 people.

- 2nd April 2015: Garissa University attack, at least 148 people, mostly students killed by Al Shabaab militants.

- 15th - 16th January 2019: Terrorist attacked the Dusit D2 Hotel complex at 14 Riverside in Nairobi killing 21 people and wounding 28 others.

The causes of terrorist attacks are linked to the Kenya's military intervention in Somalia, the close ties with Israel and western countries, especially the US. The oppression, violation, marginalization, and injustice shouldered by refugees, especially Somali refugees. Their patriotism questioned, even for those with a national identity card must pay bribes to live in their own country. This contributes to their vulnerability, a push factor for radicalization, easy inclination to terrorist activities, easy recruits into extreme religious ideologies and more vulnerable to the Al-Shabaab recruitment (Kibor, 2016). Previous research on radicalization made a conclusion that marginalization and unemployment among youth is a factor that leads to the youth being absorbed into the radical groups (Jerejian, 2017). Reports by the national security management agencies

have linked refugees with criminal networks. The Kenyan government announced the closure of Dadaab camp in 2016 on the assertion that it was a breeding ground for terrorists and radicalization of some individuals and groups (Reuters, 2021). The camps gave refugees the opportunity to easily move in and recruit youths into the Al Shabaab group. The Government still stands with the argument that refugee camps specifically Dadaab camp, are used by the group as a hideout and a training ground for the terrorists (Migiro, 2018).

Kenya-Somalia border points have become tremendously insecure and porous. Some criminal elements have been able to buy their way back into the country through illegal border passages facilitated by security and immigration officials. During the Operation Usalama Watch, some criminal elements who had been deported to Somalia on suspicion of engaging in terrorist activities were able to find their way back to Kenya after paying a small facilitation fee to security personnel manning roadblocks along the Garissa-Nairobi highway (Kenya National Commission on Human Rights Occasional Report, 2014). On November 19, 2012, Kenyan police from four different units unleashed wave of abuses and torture against Somali and Ethiopian refugees and Kenyan-Somalis in Eastleigh. The police repeatedly accused them of being Al Shabaab terrorists. The motivation for the abuses by the Kenya police appeared to be retaliation for some 30 attacks on law enforcement officials and civilians by unknown perpetrators in Kenya since October 2011. To date only one person, a Kenyan national not of Somali ethnicity, has been convicted for one of the attacks (Human Rights Watch Kenyan Police Abuse of Refugees in Nairobi, 2013). Policy consequences has left refugees feeling marginalized and discriminated against, as they operate in an environment in which durable solutions remains elusive, local integration, repatriation and resettlement are less promoted and cannot be openly discussed and, the return to Somalia hampered by active Al Shabaab militias and insecurity. The failure to find durable solutions to Somali refugees in Kenya drives desperation in the community. For many, this has led migration through non-legal routes and made especially younger refugees more vulnerable to the Al-Shabaab recruitment (Hovil, 2017). Inadequate policy and Kenya's open-door policy on refugees has been identified as a significant factor contributing to the national security challenges, the initial provisions set out by the Kenyan government towards refugees were temporary, as it was assumed that the Somali refugees would return home once the situation was stabilized (Kumssa, 2014).

Since December 2014, UNHCR has been facilitating, although not promoting returns. However, few Somali refugees have opted to return. According to UNHCR, between December 2014 and July 2021, some 85,267 Somali refugees (fewer than 2,000 per month), have been assisted to return (UNHCR Somalia Monthly Refugee Returnee Report, 2021). The Department of Refugees Affairs in Kenya has of several times stopped registration of refugees in Nairobi and even forced many refugees, especially Somali refugees, to leave urban areas of Nairobi to refugee camps due to insecurity concerns (NRC Recognizing Nairobi's Refugees Report, 2017). The National Taskforce

on Repatriation of Refugees from Dadaab Refugee Complex report also raised security concerns citing the "proliferation of small arms and light weapons which has compromised Kenya's international security rating" (Taskforce report, 2016). This study investigated whether refugees are a threat to national security. The study targeted the refugee urban population of 79, 785 Somali refugees, who currently resides in Nairobi, Eastleigh North/South, Kamukunji Constituency.

Research Objectives

i. To examine whether refugees portend any security threats in Kenya.

ii. To evaluate the relationship between refugees and terror activities in Kenya.

iii. To examine whether the Kenya's open-door policy on refugees is a threat to national security.

Theoretical Literature Review

Theoretical Framework

Securitisation Theory:

Buzan, Waever and Wilde developed securitization theory in 1998. In securitisation theory, a security issue is posited (by a securitizing actor) as a threat to the survival of some referent object (nation, state, the forest), which is claimed to have a right to survive. Since the question of survival is fundamental, it is not defensible to leave this issue to normal politics, securitizing actor therefore claims a right to break rules, for reasons of security, and security actors mobilize their audience by leading a security discourse to become capable of implementing extraordinary means or security policies for reasons of security. Securitisation can be defined as the socially constructed notion of an issue as a security threat, Securitisation process ranges from non-politicized to politicized and then securitized. (Karyotis, 2013).In May 2016, Kenyan government decided to close all refugee camps due to an increase in the levels of insecurity. The decision to close down Kakuma camp was later reversed with the government explaining that links to insecurity was only found in Dadaab camps, whose majority of refugee population is the Somalis (Daily Nation, Thursday, February 9, 2017). This is a securitisation act by the Kenyan government to the refugees, especially Somali refugees, by labelling them as a threat.

Refugees bring in a significant flow of resources in form of human capital and international humanitarian assistance. However, they also impose threats to security, they often associated with crime and terrorism (Benam, 2011). This social issue politicized by the political actors and labelled as a threat to the national security, resulting in taking extreme measures such as sending back refugees to their countries. In addition, closing refugee camps and expelling or returning refugees to situation in which their life or freedom would be in jeopardy, which is against refugee policy based on the principle of asylum and non-refoulement (Migiro, 2018). While voluntary repatriation

is recognized under article v of the Organization of African Unity in 1969 refugee convention, many refugees are not willing to go back to Somalia due to instability, though the government has an upper hand in sending them back (Amnesty International, 2017).Securitisation theory introduced by Barry Buzan's and Ole Waever's Copenhagen School focused on securitizing issues as speech acts, they define issues as a security problem, then implement extraordinary actions. Political actors with great influence in Kenya promote securitizing speech acts, speeches of politicians and others who have an influence on security politics as well as publications of institutions and scientists are analyzed in this context (Köhler, 2019). Kenyan government portrays refugees, especially Somali refugees as linked to terrorism. In securitisation theory an object is labelled as a security threat, and by referring to them as security issue, they become security problem (Wæver, 2011). This act of speech makes Kenya take extreme measures and actions permitted under the circumstances though may be undemocratic, for instance, closing refugee camps and expelling all refugees, a move that appears to offer temporary solutions, may be counterproductive and puts regional stability at risk (Vito, 2016).

The issue of closing the camps has been in the public domain since 2013, it has become highly publicized locally and internationally, policy issues and court cases have risen from this, securitisation theory is used as analytical tool to understand this issue (Migiro, 2018). Securitisation theory provides the researcher with a framework that critically examine the motivations behind an act of security (Cote, 2016). Securitisation theory uses a sociological approach. It explains how security is socially constructed by securitizing issues; it explains how security actors socially mobilize their audience, which constitute the citizens or government elite in non-democratic system, by framing security issues and lead a security discourse to implement extraordinary actions. Securitisation theory is useful in this study because it clearly defines the role of the audiences that is critical for understanding legitimacy behind an act of security (Karyotis, 2013). The initial approach of the Copenhagen School paid little attention on defining the role of the audience.

Securitisation theory provides a single theoretical framework that enables the researcher to explain the behavior of both state and non-state parties involved in the security issue; this framework helps the researcher clearly understand the mutual constitution of securitizing actors and audiences. However, securitization does not require consent of entire audience; it only requires the consent of enough of the audience referred to as the critical mass. This theory explains whether a group can legitimize its violent behavior and to what extent, though securitization studies traditionally center legitimization from the side of the authorities, to exercise control over the population and maintain the political order (Vultee, 2011). Securitisation theory gives a useful approach for analyzing root causes of crime and violence, while concentrating on citizen security and institutions that deals with security. This approach is fundamentally oriented in exploring

traditional threats and issues of crime and violence thus narrowing the broad approach of human security. However, this approach carries the risk of giving lower priority to others and sometimes more fundamental issues of human security and to the rights and needs of non-citizens who risk social exclusion and possibly leading to stigmatization. However, how do we know we are dealing with a security threat? Securitisation theory provides an answer though incomplete; it rules out that the meaning of security threat varies in different context (Charrett, 2009). Different context explains why some securitizing moves are, accepted by some audiences though they are not conceptualized as constitutes of speech acts. Therefore, securitisation is contextual, is not very well understood outside historical and cultural context in which security discourse took place (Sulovic, 2010).

Securitisation theory has contributed in much of the European debates over the social construction of security. This theory has from the beginning pointed at the audience as the filter between the speech act and the actors. Such a move would perhaps be one of the indicators of the Western Europe, characterized by democratic state that is not applicable everywhere (Sheikh, 2018). In the context of this study, Kenya is not entirely democratic and therefore leaving the decision wholly to the audience to come up with the decision would be more than fictitious (Sulovic, 2010). Rita Floyd (2016) has argued that securitisation theory should skip the idea of using the audience as is not applicable to all places, but instead measure the success of the securitisation move by ensuring concrete action are followed by the securitizing actor. Most research on securitisation focuses on democratic states, especially European and other Western countries, there is a gap in research that describes securitisation theory in undemocratic and non-western context. For instance, terms such as audience not adequately developed in non-western countries. This research will contribute to the deeper understanding of securitisation theory especially in non-western settings such as Kenya; the findings in this study will contribute to filling this gap in the literature.

Arguably, the inability of Kenyan state to distinguish between Kenyan Somalis, Somali Islamist militants and refugees represents a missed opportunity at national integration, a gap complicating securitisation theory, and Kenya's fight on terrorism (Dominic, 2015). Securitisation theory narrow concept of security as safeguarding state from threats emanating from outside boarders, Securitisation theory has also failed to address the emergence of non-military threats such as migrants and refugees. In security context, migration is collective term that refers to people moving and becoming migrants, the words migrant and refugee legally means two different statuses of people, yet often used interchangeably. Migration may be an individual choice - pull factors, with respect to documented settlement and residence rights, but can also be for the reasons that force people, people under crisis - push factors to migrate, hence can also fall under the legal definitions of asylum seekers and refugees (BBC, 2015). The definition of these terms includes people who are under crisis or regular economic migrants as well, and still undergo the legal

process of requesting asylum and be granted refugee status. Securitizing migration and the close interconnection between migration and security as illustrated in this literature leads the researcher to introduce the Laws of Migration, the "Push and Pull" theory.

Push and Pull Theory

Ernst. G. Raventstein developed the Laws of Migration "Push and Pull" theory in 1889. He used census data of migration from England to Wales to develop Laws of Migration. He argued it is not normal habit for people to move from one place to another, and that migration was because of push and pull factors. In his theory, he stated the following: most migrants move a short distance at a time; long distance migrations come from large cities, most migration is from rural areas to urban areas, most international migrants consist of young males, migration increases in volume as industries develop and transportation improves and that the economy is a major factor in migration. There has been an increase in global migration (Gerard, 2014). Presently, the access to modern information and communications technology has made it easier for people to travel back and forth in search of opportunities (Koser, 2011). According to the United Nations, an estimated 258 million people live outside the country of their birth. This is an increase of 49% since 2000 (Un.org, 2018). In this literature, push and pull theory emphasizes on the conceptual clarity, the root causes of refugees and the presences of so-called economic refugees and migration.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines migration as movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border or within a State. Migration and security are greatly interconnected (Koser, 2011). Securitisation of migration intensified after the 9/11 that profoundly affected the American national security (Rudolph, 2017). Migration is non-traditional form of security threat and can be a threat to the sovereignty, autonomy, and territorial integrity of states and even a potential source of conflicts or disputes. As mentioned previously, migrants are pushed-pulled, undocumented or documented thus the consequent security implications and legal statuses largely differ. This literature speaks of undocumented migration, illegal migration, which are increasingly perceived by the governments and citizens as a security threat (Collier, 2014). Migrants, just like refugees are marginalized, discriminated or isolated from the host countries, undermined by the current political regimes, government policies and poor governance leading (pushing) them to support opposition groups and insurgent movements, thus direct oppositions to the state authorities created in disenfranchised communities, manifested in perpetrating violent forms in terrorist attacks (Aziz, 2017).

In this theory, push factors highlights the conditions conducive to violent extremism among refugees that include lack of socio-economic opportunities, discrimination and marginalization, violation of human rights and Rule of Law, prolonged and unresolved conflicts, and radicalization (Nanes and Lau, 2018). Several factors such as insecurity, limited livelihood opportunities in

camps, suffering widespread exclusion, overcrowded camps, lack of adequate education opportunities, unemployment and lack of medical services also push refugees to leave their camps for Nairobi (Campbell, 2012). There has been no registration of newly arriving refugees in Dadaab for up to two years, this policy seems motivated by government's fear that registration will act as a pull factor and undermine returns. Nonetheless, having a large unregistered and untracked refugee population seems counterproductive from a national security perspective. Other pull factors mainly refer to individual motivations and processes that play a key role in transforming ideas and grievances into violent extremist action. These include factors such as individual backgrounds and motivations, distortion and misuse of beliefs, political ideologies and ethnic and cultural differences, and leadership and social networks (Nanes and Lau, 2018).

Between December 2014 and February 28, 2017, UNHCR assisted 52,591 Somali refugees to return, this was fewer than 2,000 per month despite the existing ration cuts in the camps and increased pressure to close the camps. The fact that UNHCR was facilitating and not promoting returns may have led to few Somali refugees opting to return. Prior use of push and pull theory may have offered a clear conceptual clarity, a useful approach that ensured that Somali refugees had prior access to adequate information about conditions and situations in Somalia as part of the repatriation process. With limited resettlement places and local integration considered difficult, leaves Somali refugees with little choice. Some go underground in Kenya or back to Somalia, where they risk drawn into the conflicts among other fresh cycle of push factors (Hovil, 2017). Migration as a global phenomenon has received substantial literary work. It's security implications not only discussed in real life political realms but academia too. This research acknowledges that there are both push and pull factors such as natural disasters, conflicts, political insecurities, environmental degradation, economic insecurities, and poverty, this theory further acknowledges that majority of the immigration systems split migrants into three main categories, ordinary refugees, economic refugees, and political refugees. However, drivers such as asylum seekers fall into the 'push' factors (Eurostat, 2018). There is no doubt some economic refugees, migrants masquerade as asylum seekers to enter Kenya and other rich countries.

Controlling borders and being able to monitor and regulate migration flows is hence a fundamental concept of state sovereignty. It is important to note that those coming in are genuine asylum seekers. Others are economic migrants who are taking advantage of the exodus with hopes of making it to Kenya as asylum seekers. However, Kenya may not offer the answers these refugees and migrants are looking for which may ignite a sense of disenfranchisement and dissatisfaction that could eventually become dangerous (Epstein, 2010). Governments, especially the United States use economic aid to persuade other governments such as Kenya to retain their refugees and asylum seekers. UNHCR and other International Agencies provide economic aids and resources to refugee hosting countries, especially Kenya, not only as an expression of western humanitarian

concerns but also as a means of enabling refugees to remain in Kenya, the country of first asylum rather than attempting to move elsewhere, especially to the advanced industrial countries (UNHCR Funding Update, 2021).


Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

Research Methodology

The research was conducted using Mixed Methods Research Design. Which incorporated both qualitative and quantitative approaches in data collection, data analysis and interpretation of the evidence. The study targeted Somali refugees living in (Eastleigh North/South), Kamukunji Constituency, Nairobi, Kenya. Primary data was collected using interview guide administered to security officials (Police official or agent), Somali refugees, and key informants in UNHCR, Danish Refugee Council, and Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government officials. Secondary data was obtained from desk reviews and analyzing publications of scholars, journals, websites, newsletters, newspapers, government reports and published materials. Purposive sampling techniques and simple random sampling was used for this study. Data was analyzed using quantitative and qualitative techniques. Quantitative data presented in form of tables and charts and data analysis done in SPSS using descriptive statistics in the form of

frequencies and percentages, related measurement scales such as nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio with variables and interpreted the results.

Results

Refugees portend security threats in Kenya

This study assessed whether refugees portend any security threats in Kenya.

Table 1: Refugees portend security threats in Kenya

Response	Weight	Frequency	Score	Percentage
Strongly Disagree	1	10	10	10
Disagree	2	12	24	12
Neither agree or disagree	3	15	45	15
Agree	4	45	180	46
Strongly Agree	5	17	85	17
Total		99	344	100

Source: (Author, 2022).

Most (46%) of the respondents indicated that refugees presented security threats in Kenya. From the data a few 10 (10%) of the respondents strongly disagreed that refugees presented security threats, 12 (12%) of the respondents disagreed, 15 (15%) of the respondents neither agreed or disagreed and 17 (17%) of the respondents strongly agreed. The total scores recorded for this research question were 344 which is equivalent to 3.5 (344/99 = 3.474747475) points. The 3.5 mean weight falls within the agreed range and this leads to a conclusion that refugees presented security threats in Kenya. This finding was also seconded by the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government Officer who said,

'Kenya hosts many refugees from Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Eritrea which has overstretched the capacity of security officers in ensuring that there is security within our borders.' (Security Officer, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government).

The respondents indicated that armed groups such as Al Shabaab have used refugee camps to recruit fighters and refugees as the main carriers of illegal firearms and weapons linked to

terrorism. Similar finding was also indicated by the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government Officer who said,

'Some refugees from war-torn countries such as Somalia are militant sympathizers, they provide source of militia in their country of origin and secretly support militants such as Al Shabaab. They hide terror weapons which are smuggled in the country via the camps by the same refugees claiming to flee for safety.'

According to a participant of an institution dealing with refugees, there has been an increase in radicalization especially among young refugees who resort to engage in terrorist activities. Radicalization has majorly contributed to the heightened insecurity situation in Kenya. The Kenyan government has made statements that terror attacks are planned in the refugee camps, the refugee camps are alleged to be the main trafficking route for weapons and that the location of refugee camps near worn-torn states complicates this volatile security situation as more and more arrivals continue to flow in.The government through the Department of Refugee Affairs and UNHCR has been involved in screening purported refugees and issuance of refugee identification cards which assists to monitor refugee movements. The government also established a fence along Somalia border to control movement of migrants and refugees. The finding was also reflected by the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government Officer and the UNHCR Officer who said,

'Some of those coming in from Somalia are genuine asylum seekers fleeing war, others are economic migrants taking advantage of the exodus.' (UNHCR Officer).'Security officials are fearful some refugees and migrants may have bad motives.' (Security Officer, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government).

Relationship between refugees and terror activities in Kenya

This study assessed whether there is a relationship between refugees and terror activities in Kenya.

Table 2: Relationship between refugees and terror activities in Kenya

Response	Weight	Frequency	Score	Percentage
Strongly Disagree	1	7	7	7
Disagree	2	11	22	11
Somehow agree	3	13	39	13
Agree	4	54	216	55
Strongly Agree	5	14	70	14
Total		99	354	100

Source: (Author, 2022).

Majority (55%) of the respondents indicated there was a relationship between refugees and terror activities. From the findings a few 7 (7%) of the respondents strongly disagreed, 11 (11%) of the respondents disagreed, 13 (13%) of the respondents somehow agreed and 14 (14%) of the respondents strongly agreed. The total scores recorded for this research question were 354 which is equivalent to 3.6 (354/99 = 3.575757576) points. The 3.6 mean weight falls within the agreed range and this leads to a conclusion that indeed there is a relationship between refugees and terror activities in Kenya. This finding was also indicated by the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government Officer who said,

'Refugees threaten national security, Al Shabaab have infiltrated refugee camps disguised as refugees from where they are able to facilitate and perpetrate terror acts within and outside the camps.' (Security Officer, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government).

This has made the camps vulnerable and insecure leading to numerous attacks within and outside the camps. The finding was also echoed by the UNHCR Officer and the Danish Refugee Council Officer who said.

'Refugees have contributed to insecurity through trading in contraband, gun running and perpetrating terror attacks in Kenya.' (UNHCR Officer and the Danish Refugee Council Officer).

www.carijournals.org

Table 3: Refugee camps are believed to be breeding ground for terrorists and provides avenues for refugee combatant recruitment.

Response	Weight	Frequency	Score	Percentage
Not at all	1	3	3	3
Rarely	2	8	16	8
Sometimes	3	13	39	13
Very Often	4	16	64	16
To a great extent	5	59	295	60
Total		99	417	100

Source: (Author, 2022).

Majority (60%) of the respondents to a greater extent indicated that refugee camps offer breeding ground for terrorists and provides avenues for refugee combatant recruitment. From the findings a few 3 (3%) of the respondents strongly disagreed. The total scores recorded for this research question were 417 which is equivalent to 4.2 (417/99 = 4.212121212) points. The 4.2 mean weight falls within the very often range and this leads to a conclusion that very often refugee camps offer breeding ground for terrorists and provide avenues where militia are recruited.

The finding was also reflected by the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government Officer who said,

'Refugee camps located close to the boundary such as Dadaab camps provides sanctuary to rebel organizations. Camps provides a base for terror activities and a fertile ground to carry out recruitment.' (Security Officer, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government).

Table 4: Refugees are recruited into terror organizations through extreme religious doctrines.

Response	Weight	Frequency	Score	Percentage
Strongly Disagree	1	4	4	4
Disagree	2	4	8	4
Somehow agree	3	21	63	21
Agree	4	51	204	52
Strongly Agree	5	19	95	19
Total		99	374	100

Source: (Author, 2022).

Most (52%) of the respondents agreed that refugees were recruited into terror organizations through extreme religious doctrines. A few 4 (4%) of the respondents strongly disagreed. The total scores recorded for this research question were 374 which is equivalent to 3.7 (374/99 = 3.777777778) points. The 3.7 mean weight falls within the agreed range and this leads to a conclusion that refugees are recruited into terror organizations through radicalization.

This finding was also indicated by the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government Officer who said, 'Refugee population from Somalia is huge and is more likely to contain Islamic radicals who cause insecurity situation in Kenya.' (Security Officer, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government). According to Danish Refugee Council Officer:'Some refugees are radicalized because they face many years of hard life, poverty and marginalization on access to jobs and education, making them vulnerable for recruitment by armed groups and organizations like the Islamic State and Al Shabaab who perceive this crisis as an opportunity, thus posing real threats to us.' (Danish Refugee Council Officer).

Table 5: Refugees are involved in smuggling arms and weapons used in terror activities.

Response	Weight	Frequency	Score	Percentage
Never	1	3	3	3
Rarely	2	2	4	2
Sometimes	3	20	60	20
Very Often	4	54	216	55
Always	5	20	100	20
Total		99	383	100

Source: (Author, 2022).

Most (55%) of the respondents indicated that very often refugees are involved in smuggling arms and weapons used in terror activities. The total scores recorded for this research question were 383 which is equivalent to 3.8 (383/99 = 3.868686869) points. This leads to a conclusion that refugees very often are involved in smuggling arms and weapons used in terror activities. This finding was also echoed by the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government Officer who said, 'Refugees in the surrounding urban areas of Nairobi hide terror merchants, and police have seized weapons among refugees. The camps are also the main trafficking hub for smuggled goods and weapons which has led to the insecurity and armed crimes.' (Security Officer, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government).

This finding was also echoed by the Danish Refugee Council Officer who said,

'There are violent incidents reported involving firearms in the northern parts of Garissa, Moyale and Mandera, uncontrolled firearms are directly or indirectly linked to refugees and pose a significant threat to the stability not only in these parts of Kenya but also surrounding areas thus undermining national security.' (Danish Refugee Council Officer).

Kenya's open-door policy on refugees is a threat to national security:

This study assessed whether Kenya's open-door policy on refugees is a threat to national security.

Table 6: Kenya's open-door policy on refugees is a threat to national security

Response	Weight	Frequency	Score	Percentage
Strongly Disagree	1	9	9	10
Disagree	2	4	8	4
Somehow agree	3	12	36	13
Agree	4	52	208	56
Strongly Agree	5	16	80	17
Total		93	341	100

Source: (Author, 2022).

Majority (56%) of the respondents agreed that Kenya's open-door policy on refugees is a threat to national security. The total scores recorded for this research question were 341 which is equivalent to 3.7 (341/93 = 3.666666667) points. The 3.7 mean weight falls within the agreed range and this leads to a conclusion that Kenya's open-door policy on refugees is a threat to national security. This finding was also indicated by the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government Officer who said, 'The current rise in terrorist activities in Kenya has been associated with the increase in number of refugees especially from Somalia, the anti-terror police operations have targeted aliens hiding and pretending to be refugees. Militant fighters, Al Shabaab join refugee camps as genuine refugees and perform criminal activities in Kenya. Relocating refugees would reduce extremists and Al Shabaab fighters' existence in the country.' (Security Officer, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government).

According to UNHCR Officer: 'Screening and background checks for refugees is important, this because the presence of armed elements in camps pose a threat to the regional stability, uncontrolled and irregular movement of refugees and migrants across international borders is a challenge to the sovereignty of the host countries such as Kenya.' (UNHCR Officer). This finding was also echoed by the Danish Refugee Council Officer who said, 'Terrorist activities have prompted the government to introduce changes to the Refugees Act of 2006. Earlier, refugees were allowed to live in cities, in 2014 the Kenyan High Court ruled that this policy directive violated the principle of non-refoulement and amended the Act, making encampment policy permanent.' (Danish Refugee Council Officer).

Table 7: Best approaches in dealing with refugees related insecurity (Policies and Laws)

Response	Weight	Frequency	Score	Percentage
Strongly Disagree	1	1	1	1
Disagree	2	4	8	4
Somehow agree	3	13	39	14
Agree	4	61	244	64
Strongly Agree	5	16	80	17
Total		95	372	100

Source: (Author, 2022).

Majority (64%) of the respondents indicated that policies and laws were the best approaches in dealing with refugees related insecurity. The total scores recorded for this research question were 372 which is equivalent to 4 (372/95 = 3.915789474) points. The 4 mean weight falls within the agreed range and this leads to a conclusion that refugees preferred policies and laws as the best approaches in dealing with insecurity. The most common cited policies, laws and best approaches included resettlement, local integration, voluntary repatriation and involving various stakeholders. Expelling refugees, forceful returnees and closing refugee camps were least cited by the respondents. According to UNHCR Officer, refugees preferred returning to their country of origin only when provided with the necessary assistance for safe return and assistance to reintegrate in their home country. The officer indicated,

'Resettlement is an important policy and a durable solution for the protection and welfare of refugees. Local integration is equally an important solution, this is a community strategy where refugees are legally, socially, and economically integrated in the host country Kenya, thus have equal rights as the nationals.' (UNHCR Officer).

Conclusion

The study concludes that refugees presented security threats in Kenya, this was linked to proliferation of small arms and weapons used in terror activities, many refugees were militants and Al Shabaab sympathizers and secretly supported it course, and an increase in radicalization among young refugees engaged in terror activities. The study also concludes that there was a relationship between refugees and terror activities, Al Shabaab and militants have infiltrated the refugee camps

disguised as refugees from where they perpetrate terror activities. Refugee camps offered breeding ground for terrorists and provided avenues for refugee combatant recruitment. The study also concludes that Kenya's open-door policy on refugees led to infiltration of Al Shabaab and militants disguised as refugees contributing to an increase in insecurity and terrorism. Terrorism is one of the biggest threats against which all countries and the international community must strive to eliminate, the Kenyan government should ensure that measures to counter terrorism are according to humanitarian standards and does not violate human rights. Kenya values the rights to every refugee as well as the rights of others, the Kenyan government echoes importance of the rule of law and certain terror acts such as Westgate terror attack, Garissa College terror attack, among many other terror acts are inhuman and no refugee policy can accept approval of such persons involved.

Recommendations:

The study recommends that the United Nations and the International Community should help end conflicts in Somalia, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Sudan and, strengthen government institutions to counter conflicts and displacement in the region. When peace is not guaranteed in their country of origin then voluntary or forceful repatriation policy may not yield fruits. The study further recommends border control and refugee screening system that focuses on identification and keeping tabs of the general refugees' criminal history. The UNHCR and the Kenyan government to continue aiding, providing support and protection to refugees enabling them to have their rights and basic needs. The study recommends integration and resettlement of refugees with support from the Kenyan government, UNHCR, United Nations and World Bank. The study recommends local community development strategies such as integration and resettlement, that could improve livelihoods in additions to enhancing their affiliation with the refugee population. This strategy help improve the welfare of refugees, encourage coexistence, and reduces the tension between refugees and host community.

References

Amnesty International (2017). Not Time To Go Home: Unsustainable Returns of Refugees to Somalia. Retrieved from: https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Report_Not-time-to-go-home.pdf (Accessed 4 September 2021).

Anna Lindley (2011) "Between a Protracted and a Crisis Situation: Policy Responses to Somali Refugees in Kenya." Refugee Survey Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2011): 36.

Aziz, Sahar F. (2017). "Losing the 'War of Ideas': A Crique of Countering Violent Extremism Programs." Texas A&M University School of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No.17-22

Benam, Çiğdem H. (2011). "Emergence of a 'Big Brother' in Europe: border control and securitization of migration". Insight Turkey (Ankara) 13.3 (2011).

Beyani, Chaloka. (2014). Human Rights Standards and the Free Movement of People within States. Oxford University Press.

BBC. (2015). Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts. Retrieved from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911 (Accessed 10 September 2021).

Buzan, B. (1983). People, States & Fear: The national security problem in international relations. United States: University of North Carolina Press. Page 8

Campbell, Elizabeth H. (2016). Urban Refugees in Nairobi: Problems of Protection, Mechanisms of Survival, and Possibilities for Integration. Journal of Refugee Studies Vol 19, No.3

Campbell, Elizabeth H. (2006). Urban Refugees in Nairobi: Problems of Protection, Mechanisms of Survival, and Possibilities for Integration. Journal of Refugee Studies Vol 19 (3): 396-413

Charrett, C. (2009). A critical application of securitization theory: overcoming the normative dilemma of writing security.

Clapier, L. & Astrid, W. (2015). The construction of illegality in Nairobi: An analysis of urban refugees' coping mechanisms. A published thesis for Master of Development and International Relations, Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University Copenhagen. Retrieved from: https://projekter.aau.dk/projekter/files/213266629/Urban_refugees_thesis_2015_final.pdf (Accessed 11 January 2021).

Collier, P. (2014). Illegal Migration To Europe : What Should Be Done? Social Europe Journal, 9.9 Retrieved from: https://social-europe.eu/2014/09/illegal-migration (Accessed 27 December 2021).

Dominic Burbidge (2015). The Kenyan State's Fear of Somali Identity. Retrieved from: https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-kenyan-states-fear-of-somali-identity/ (Accessed 10 September 2021).

Dr. Lucy Hovil (2017). Protection for refugees not from refugees: Somalis in exile and the securitisation of refugee policy. Retrieved from: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Somalis%20in%20Exile_0.pdf (Accessed 2 September 2021).

Emma Hurlbert (2020). Kenya and the Securitization of Refugees. The Security Distillery.

Ernst. G. Ravenstein (1876). The Birthplaces of the People and the Laws of Migration. Kessinger Legacy Reprints.

Ernst Hirsch Ballin (2020). Security in an Interconnected World: A Strategic Vision for Defense Policy. Retrieved from: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-030-37606-2.pdf (Accessed 16 October 2021).

Epstein, Gil S. (2010). Migration and Culture. Emerald Group Publishing

Gerard, A. (2014). The securitization of migration and refugee women. Routledge.

Human Rights Watch (2013). "You Are All Terrorists". Police Abuse of Refugees in Nairobi. Retrieved from: https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/29/you-are-all-terrorists/kenyan-police-abuse-refugees-nairobi (Accessed 10 September 2021).

Jerejian, T. E. (2017). "A Helping Hand?" Recruitment of Kenyan Youth to al-Shabaab (Master's thesis).

Karyotis, Georgios, and Dimitris Skleparis (2013). "Qui Bono? The Winners and Losers of Securitising Migration." Griffith Law Review 22.3 (2013): 683-706.

Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (2014). Are We Under Siege? The State of Security in Kenya. An Occasional Report

Kibor , R. (2016). Terrorism and Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Contextual Analysis. Retrieved from: http://erepo.usiu.ac.ke/bitstream/handle/11732/4527/KIBOR%20ROBERT%20KIBET%20MAIR%202018.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (Accessed 17 October 2021).

Kirui P and Mwaruvie J. (2012). The Dilemma of Hosting Refugees: A Focus on the Insecurity in North Eastern Kenya.' International Journal of Business and Social Science, 3 (2012), 161-162.

Koser, K. (2011). When is migration a security issue? Brookings, 31 (3).

Köhler, I. (2019). Framing the Threat: How Politicians justify their Policies. De Gruyter

Oldenbourrg.

Kumssa, A, Williams, J. H, Jones, J.F and Des Marais, E.A. (2014). Conflict and Migration:The Case of Somali Refugees in Northeastern Kenya. Springer International Publishing.

Migiro, K. (2018). Kenya calls for more funding to return Somali refugees from Dadaab.

Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-refugees/kenya-calls-for-morefundingto-return-somali-refugees-from-dadaab-idUSKCN11R270 (Accessed 4 September 2021).

Mogire E. (2011). Victims as Insecurity Threats: Refugee Impact on Host State, Security in Africa, Ashgate Publishing Company, England, 2011, 17.

Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government (2017). Negative Effects of Terrorism Report. Retrieved from: https://ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/AdvisoryCom/Terrorism/Kenya.pdf

(Accessed 18 August 2021).

Nanes, Matthew and Bryony Lau (2018). "Surveys and Countering Violent Extremism: A Practitioner Guide." The Asia Foundation and Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved from: https://www.asiafoundation.org/publication/surveys-countering-violent-extremism/ (Accessed 27 December 2021)

NRC (2017). Recognizing Nairobi's Refugees (2017). Retrieved from: https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/refugees-in-nairobi/recognising-nairobis-refugees.pdf (Accessed 17 October 2021)

Reuters (2021). Kenya tells U.N. it will shut two camps with 410,000 refugees by June 2022 Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/kenya-tells-un-it-will-shut-two-camps-with-410000-refugees-by-june-2022-2021-04-29/ (Accessed 17 October 2021).

Rudolph, C. (2017). National security and immigration in the United States after 9/11. UC San Diego Working Papers. Retrieved from https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt8rq8k6nd/qt8rq8k6nd.pdf (Accessed 27 December 2020).

Sheikh, M. (2018). Securitization analysis beyond its power-critique. Global Discourse, 8(1), 80-82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2017.1414445

UNHCR (2021). UNHCR's financial requirements 2021. Funding Update. Retrieved from: https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/fundingupdates/2021-09-07/Kenya%20Funding%20Update%2007%20September%202021.pdf (Accessed 11 September 2021).

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2019). Global trends: Forced displacement in 2019 Retrieved from: https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/5ee200e37/unhcr-global-trends-2019.html (Accessed 11 January 2021).

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020). Registered refugees and Asylum Seekers in Kenya. Retrieved from: https://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp-

content/uploads/sites/2/2020/02/Kenya-Infographics-31-January-2020.pdf (Accessed 11 January 2021).

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2020). Kenya Refugee Response Plan for South Sudanese. Retrieved from: https://www.unhcr.org/ke/kakuma-refugee-camp (Accessed 15 August 2021).

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2021). UNHCR Somalia Monthly Refugee Returnee Report - July 2021. Retrieved from: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/88142 (Accessed 31 August 2021).

Vito (2016). Ineffective and dangerous: Kenya's refugee camp closure puts regional stability at risk. Retrieved from: https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2016/12/kenya-camp-closure (Accessed 5 September 2021).

Vultee (2011). Securitization. Retrieved from: DOI: 10.1080/17512780903172049 (Accessed 5 September 2021).

Wæver, Ole (2011). "Politics, security, theory." Security Dialogue 42.4-5 (2011): 465-480