Journal of
Historical Studies
(JHS)

ROMANO-PARTHIAN MACHINATIONS FROM CARRHAE TO THE ASSASSINATION OF JULIUS CAESAR

DR DARYN GRAHAM



CARI Journals

Journal of Historical Studies

Vol. 3, Issue No. 1, pp 1 - 18, 2022 www.carijournals.org

ROMANO-PARTHIAN MACHINATIONS FROM CARRHAE TO THE ASSASSINATION OF JULIUS CAESAR

DR DARYN GRAHAM

daryngraham@hotmail.com

Independent Researcher, Graduate Student, Macquarie University.

Dr Daryn Graham has a PhD from Macquarie University and two MA degrees from the University of Sydney.

Sydney, Australia.

Purpose: The purpose of this article is to reveal the scheming and plotting behind the veneer of the narrative of an earth-changing era in Roman history, in a new way, by demonstrating that Roman and Parthian worlds influenced, and impinged upon, each other in ways not always covered in extant modern literature.

Methodology: The methodology applied throughout this article is that of historical analysis, using ancient sources in light of modern scholarship. However, this is done in a unique, learned sense, in that it seeks to look at the period covered by this article in a more broad sense geographically than most treatments on the Late Republic do, but doing so still by focussing upon an aspect of history, namely the historical interchange between Rome and Parthia.

Findings: This article finds that Roman politics was not performed in a vacuum. Rather, it existed in a world where examples, and precedents, inspired a range of remonstrations, and official duties. Thus, it is shown that the worlds of Rome and Parthia were closer, politically, than is often recognised during the period covered by this article.

Keywords: Rome, Parthia, Pompey, Julius Caesar.

INTRODUCTION

Marcus Licinius Crassus' defeat at Carrhae marked a turning point in Roman history, and heralded uproar, especially in the eastern provinces. Most certainly, modern historians advocate that the Romans were lured into battle by the Parthians, and Tarn believed that even if Caesar himself had have been in command of the same Roman forces against Suren and his Parthian army, he too would have been defeated (Colledge, 1967, 43; Tarn, 1975, 91; Wheeler, 1997, 576; Sheldon, 2010, 40-41). Armenia prepared to invade and conquer Cappadocia, Syria revolted, and even Cilicia made preparations for open rebellion against Rome – all with Parthian machinations and endorsement (Everitt, 2003, 193-194). Gaius Julius Caesar heard the news of the major Roman defeat while on military campaign in Gaul.

He beckoned the Senate, and others, for a future military command against Parthia, to claim vengeance, and victory, against this foe that had destroyed Rome's imperialist aims in the East, and so many lives, including Crassus' own (Fuller, 1998, 300; Freeman, 2008, 347). Not long after the Parthian victory, the general Suren was executed by Orodes II (reigned c.57-37BC), meaning that no known commemorative Parthian coins with explicit mention of Suren exist, although celebrations and commemorations relating to the famous Parthian victory most certainly did exist throughout Parthia and its empire. Parthian coins were owned by, and were the domain of, in terms of minting, Parthian kings and some usurpers who gained royal power. Suren was not to be depicted, or to be encouraged, as either (Plut. *Crass*. 33; Colledge, 1967, 43; Sellwood, 1971, 34-40; Sellwood, 1983, 290; Sheldon, 2010, 40). However, on some coins issued under Orodes II, the goddess of victory – Nike – is depicted, and the Parthian king is proclaimed 'Founder' (ΚΤΙΣΤΟΥ), much like Augustus later created his image as founder of Rome after his victory at the Battle of Actium, indicating celebrations and commemorations throughout the entire empire, and no doubt further afield wherever Parthian coinage circulated (Sellwood 1983: 290, pl . 4 (12), pl. 5 (1, 2, 3, 5)). In this article, a chronology and the key schemes within and between the Roman and Parthian domains following the Battle of Carrhae to the assassination of Julius Caesar are traced, as are the key machinations stated overtly, and hinted at, in our extant ancient sources, that lurked, and loomed large, behind that chronology and those schemes, permeating strategies and politics within and between both empires, at the highest levels, down to the lowest.

It is argued that Parthian politics had a heavy bearing on Roman politics, and that Roman politics influenced greatly how Parthian rulers and generals conducted themselves. For, while Romans were dealt a blow at Carrhae, they were able to use the lessons they learnt there against enemies, including each other, and Julius Caesar is included in this number, as are others. For their part, the Parthians learnt that Crassus was an atypical commander – seemingly bold and authoritative, but arrogant, full of hubris, creating *stasis* within his own society, without much knowledge or wisdom regarding others' ways of thinking and acting when it came to war with Parthia. That was the main lesson of the Battle of Carrhae, as was the tragedy that became Crassus' calamitous unprovoked attack of Parthia, which accordingly lost ground and momentum because it was without such a solid pretext – all of which led to his defeat, and eventual death. Other lessons were to follow, for as Sheldon and other historians emphasise, there were many strategies, tactics, ploys, and techniques that the Romans became aware of thanks to Carrhae and the events following it, in the lead up to Caesar's death (Shabazi, 1987, 489-490; Lerouge, 2007, 288-295; Sheldon, 2010, 40).

PARTHIA'S RESPONSE AND CAPITALISATION

In 51BC, Orodes II conscripted a mostly newly trained army, consisting of large numbers of elite Parthian cavalry and numerous allied soldiers, with new and fresh loyalties to the Parthian king Orodes II over and above Suren, and others like him, placing it under the command of his son Pacorus – Suren's replacement – and his seasoned general Osaces, to keep watch over Pacorus. What Orodes II did not want was another Suren, victorious in battle, and rising to terms of power to greater, and greater heights, as Pompey and Caesar did, leading to civil war, and ultimately victory for one or the other – perhaps Pacorus. This

Parthian triumvirate of military prowess was to prove an advantage to Parthia, and a thorn in Rome's side. However, unlike the First Triumvirate, which would eventually lead to the sole rule of Julius Caesar, this one would result in the sole rule of Orodes II, and his son by birth, Pacorus – although sometimes seemingly disloyal, and at some other times seemingly very disloyal – emerging as a partnership that that ousted the 'old guard', replacing it with a new breed of officials, officers, and offices. Pacorus and Osaces received these new, but trained, conscripts, near Carrhae, and mobilised them vengefully in response to Crassus' unprovoked attack, which although had no pretext that was ratified by the Roman Senate, was still endorsed, and backed, by it. Marcus Tullius Cicero was despatched to Cilicia to calm any fermenting uprisings there with his oratory, local knowledge, and swift, calculated action. Upon arrival, he took over the two legions stationed there, that were partially rebellious following Carrhae – no doubt with Parthian machinations, and local machinations, involved (Cic. *Fam*. 15. 4. 7; Plut. *Cic*. 36; Ball, 2000, 14; Everitt, 2003, 193; Sampson, 2008, 154; Sheldon, 2010, 53).

In September 51BC, at the beginning of autumn, Pacorus marched his armies west, across the Euphrates River, and set a course straight for Antioch in Syria, Rome's major eastern provincial city, and capital. He began to lay siege to Antioch, no doubt with some Roman help, including that of the prisoners of war taken by Suren and his Parthian army during, and after, the Battle of Carrhae (Cic. *Att*. 5. 18).

Gaius Cassius Longinus, who was in Antioch and was a survivor of Carrhae, defended the city, waiting for reinforcements to arrive under Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus. However, Bibulus was slow to arrive, either through fear of the Parthian armies, or through Parthian-endorsed diplomacy, or through treachery. Meanwhile, Cassius defended Antioch and its inhabitants, and counter-attacked. At the same time, Cicero marched a large portion of his army into Syria from Cilicia to the north, thus opening up a second front. Everitt argues that Cicero might have proceeded no further than the northern Syrian border, but given the crisis at hand, other historians believe he probably entered Syria in order to relieve, reinforce, and bolster Cassius' cause against the Parthians (Colledge 1967: 43; Everitt 2003: 194). Indeed, Cicero himself stated that his name 'stood high in Syria' after the ensuing battle, in which he most likely took part as a commander, together with Cassius (Cic. *Att*. 5. 20. 1-4; Sampson 2008: 159). Pacorus withdrew, perhaps feigning retreat in order to turn and attack, and claim victory, unexpectedly. Or, perhaps he was intimidated, and knew he was outwitted by Cicero's diplomacy and treachery towards Parthia. Cicero then arrived in Antioch. Pacorus had Cassius' and Cicero's combined armies caged, or so he thought. It was at this opportune point, that Cicero emboldened Cassius through use of his oratory and emotion, and Cassius led a combined force of his own soldiers and Cicero's, thus mixing the loyal and wavering Syrian and Cilician legions in a united front – not against each other, but against a foreign, and seemingly fleeing, enemy. Upon contact near Antigonea, Cassius' forces routed the enemy in battle, and his soldiers inflicted many mortal wounds upon many Parthian ones, including Osaces, who later died of these wounds. Cicero boasted, and took much of the credit, although he was not present at the battle, which earned him much criticism amongst his peers – although, no mention is made in the extant ancient sources that Cassius was among their number (Cic. *Att*. 5. 20; Bivar, 1983, 56; Everitt, 2003, 194; Sartre, 2005, 49).

Perhaps, Cicero had helped Cassius draw up his battle plans. As Everitt astutely and confidently points out, elite Romans often learned the lessons of their history, including military history, and turned the defeats of Rome's past, as well as its victories, into templates for increased success –including on the battle-field. Furthermore, Cicero was an enthusiast of Greek and Roman literature, so that meant reading histories of the expansion of Roman might throughout the Mediterranean and further afield, in the face of military enemies, was at times high on his agenda (Everitt, 2003, 12, 24-25, 29). Considering Cassius was up against superior numbers, Hannibal's ultimately successful battle plans against superior Roman numbers in 216BC at Cannae, in present-day Italy, which saw his inferior numbers envelop their Roman enemy's larger force, may be argued to have been employed (On the Battle of Cannae, see Polyb. 3. 110-118; Liv. 22. 44-52; App. *Pun*. 5. 21-25; Dio 15. 22. 1 – 15. 34. 1). Defeated, it might also be argued the Parthians then decided to outmanoeuvre and outflank Cassius and Cicero by using the battle plans of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus, which proved successful against Hannibal at Zama, in modern Tunisia, in 202BC, and thereupon surround the Roman army and create a Carrhae-like bloodbath with Romans as the defeated, once again. However, soon after the battle, Bibulus appeared in Syria with his reinforcements, and may have hastily proceeded to join Cassius somewhere near the battlefield. It may be argued, now that they were unable to outmanoeuvre and outflank their Roman adversaries, as Scipio did against Hannibal at Zama – now that Roman numbers had been bolstered – and, knowing the Romans clearly anticipated Hannibal-like tactics from the Parthians against their own similar or larger Roman numbers, against which they themselves could counter using Scipio's at Zama or elsewhere, the Parthians capitulated. In any case, they retreated east, away from another possible battle, and hence away from potential lurking danger, and another, perhaps even more decisive defeat at the hands of Cassius and Bibulus, and possibly Cicero as well (On the Battle of Zama, see Polyb. 15. 9-19; Liv. 30. 32-36; App. *Pun*. 7. 40-47; Dio 17. 50. 1 – 17. 70. 1. See also Sartre, 2005, 49).

INTERVENTIONS

The remainder of the forces under Pacorus took shelter and sustenance in and around Cyrrestica in Syria, and regrouped. Orodes II, while they were still there, then sent ambassadors to Pacorus, with a message that he was approaching, with massive, armed reinforcements (Cic. *Att*. 5. 21; Cic. *Att*. 6. 1). In August 50BC, the Parthians withdrew, with no help from Orodes II, or help from his relief forces. Cicero could not explain the king's absence or the Parthians' withdrawal, and accepted that it was the will of a god (Cic. *Att*. 6. 6; Cic. *Att*. 7. 1). The Augustan poet Horace later theorised, perhaps with later disclosed inside knowledge, that Orodes II knew that relations between Julius Caesar and Pompey were deteriorating fast, and left them to weaken each other, and destroy each other and their armies, and fleets, and attack at an opportune moment (Hor. *Ep*. 7. 1-3). Horace's literary expressions contain dramatic poetic tones, but it was a statement, and a theory, that was believed by many Romans for a long time (Mankin, 1995, 144). Indeed, Orodes II almost made an official, public, political alliance with Pompey at the beginning of the civil war (Caes. *Civ*. 3. 82; Dio 41. 55. 1 – 41. 60. 6; Debevoise, 1938, 104-105).

Most certainly, the Parthian 'King of kings' felt he had good reason to choose Pompey over Caesar, as an ally. In the mid to late 60s, Pompey had campaigned across the Caucasus mountain range in pursuit of Mithridates VI of Pontus, invading and carrying off victories in Media, Albania and Iberia, and penetrating as far as the east coast of the Black Sea. He had defeated the Colchians, the Heniochi, and the Achaei in a number of battles, and had defeated Mithridates VI of Pontus in a night battle in 66BC. He then pursued him, not east, as Alexander 'the Great' had done to Darius III, thus courting him to extend his territories further east – but west – to Armenia and then the Bosporus, where he was crushed by Pompey and Mithridates' son Pharnaces, at the head of other family members and soldiers. While he was in the north of Parthia's territories chasing and hunting Mithridates and his officers and soldiers, Pompey's ally, the Parthian king at the time, Phraates III, campaigned further south, overrunning the regions of Gordyene, to the south of Diyārbakr, near the Tigris River. Most likely, he was attacking Mithridatic allies, capitalising on their divisions and subduing them, thus taking their insurgent territories for himself. The area was then placed under the direction of the legate Lucius Afranius – the same legate who would later serve as an army commander in Spain, and who surrendered the province to Caesar, on condition he be allowed not to fight Pompey, openly. Plutarch claims he seized the area (Plut. *Pomp*. 36). However, the more trustworthy historian Cassius Dio states he occupied it without any fighting between his forces and the Parthians (Dio 37. 5. 4-5; Debevoise, 1938, 75; Bivar, 1983, 47). In fact, he helped Parthian soldiers clear the area of bandits and insurgents under Mithridates' influence (Plut. *Pomp*. 39; Sartre, 2005, 37). Revealingly, as testimony to Phraates III's and Pompey's alliance, Gordyene was soon re-entrusted to Parthia's care (Dio 37. 5. 4; Seager, 2002, 58).

Phraates III then made the request to Pompey that the Euphrates be established as the frontier between Parthia and Rome. Pompey responded that it would be so long as justice directed, most likely meaning that their agreement would have to be deliberated and agreed upon by the Roman Senate, and then ratified by it in order to make their agreement a legal precedent and part of Roman law. Besieged in his palace by Pharnaces and his forces under Rome's tutelage, Mithridates VI tried poison, and was then killed by one of his Galatian soldiers, named Bitocus. From that point, Pompey then conquered the Jews, who had hitherto largely wavered between Roman and Parthian loyalties, capturing Jerusalem. Returning to the Bosporus, Pompey then returned to Italy, leaving Pharnaces to turn on Pompey, and many of his conquests in the East open to Parthian domination. When Pompey arrived in Italy, these kingdoms rebelled against Rome, no doubt with much Parthian help (Liv. 101-102; Vell. Pat. 2. 37. 1-4; 2. 40. 1-2; Val. Max. 2. 40. 1-2; Jos. *JB*. 1. 6. 2; *JA*. 14. 3; Plut. *Pomp*. 32, 34-37; App. *Mith*. 15. 99-105; Dio 37. 11. 1 – 40. 37. 3; Sartre, 1979, 37-53; Bivar, 1983, 47, 56; Bellemore, 1999, 94-118; Sartre, 2005, 41-42). Pompey recognised that his *clientela* was of more than passing importance to him in his quests for power, and added power – boasting of its integral relationship to his political and military career, and his expanding patronage as a result, especially in East where he had campaigned successfully the most – allowing him to reward his clients, and most certainly allowing them to reward him in earnest, with united, accumulating interest (Cic. *Fam*. 9. 9. 2; Syme, 1939, 30, 32). Little wonder, in the eastern provinces, monuments to Pompey were erected bearing inscriptions such as 'warden of earth and sea' (*ILS* 9459 (Miletopolis); Syme, 1939, 30). With Parthian machinations, to appease

and please Pompey no doubt, as a ploy to weaken the state and therefore enhance Pompey's need, relevance, and position over others in Roman politics, a plot to assassinate the two consuls of that year was hatched, but it was exposed and suppressed (Sall. *Cat*. 18; Liv. 101). Still, to safeguard the Bosporus, and Mithridates VI's and Pharnaces' kingdom for Rome, and as an extended strategy to expand his patronage and *clientela*, Pompey formed Pontus into a Roman province (Liv. 102; Strab. 12. 1-2, 6; Vell. Pat. 2. 38. 6).

POMPEY AND CAESAR

Upon his return to Rome, and his triumph, Pompey was permitted by the Roman Senate to wear a gold crown and at circus games, the full apparel of a *triumvator*. At theatres, the same crown and an ornately decorated purple bordered toga he was permitted to wear. But, according to Tiberian historian Velleius Paterculus, Pompey wore these only once, besmirching his reputation with some senators, enhancing his lustre with others (Vell. Pat. 2. 40. 4; Val. Max. 2. 40. 4). Pompey was called a 'New Romulus' by the likes of many Roman senators, including some who used the title as a sneer (Vell. Pat. 2. 33. 2-4; Plut. *Pomp*. 31; *Luc*. 36; Dio 36. 46. 1; Green, 1990, 657). Then, came the consulship of Julius Caesar, in 59BC (Vell. Pat. 2. 41. 1; Val. Max. 2. 41. 1).

In the late 50s, there were moves to disband Pompey's and Caesar's veteran, and war-wearied, armies. Pompey secured his second consulship, hoping for another *proconsular* command. As a province, and area of command, Pompey chose Spain, not in the East. He did not go to Spain in person, but ruled there through his lieutenants, Lucius Afranius and Marcus Petreius, as Syme put it 'in an anomalous and arbitrary fashion', meaning his *clientela* there would be just as anomalous and arbitrary. This earned it prey-status for Caesar's machinations and take-over, which eventuated at the outset of the civil war, providing Caesar with a ready supply of supplies, manpower, and legionary soldiers (Vell. Pat. 2. 48. 1; Val. Max. 2. 48. 1; Dio 39. 39. 4; Syme, 1939, 42. Seager, 2002, 125). Just prior to the civil war, Caesar and Pompey considered moving a legion of their own each, to the eastern provinces, to escalate matters there, provoke Parthia, earn a response from its armies, and thereby claim a pretext for war. The aim was the conquest of Parthian territories – perhaps even the entire Parthian Empire, with Caesar and Pompey in command of Rome's armies on the campaign, waging a two-front attack. In previous years, this might have been seriously entertained between the two men, but civil war loomed large, casting a shadow over Roman politics like a colossal statue. Still, the idea was entertained, but not too seriously considered now, although it might have kept the two united (Syme, 1939, 38). As Gruen and Hayne have argued, the ultimate breakdown in the relationship between Caesar and Pompey and their supporters had not yet entirely unfolded. Whilst they could co-operate, and did, nonetheless their alliance, or *amicitia*, was coming apart and fraying, increasingly. It was only a matter of time before they would turn on each other irreparably, unless of course, they were able to repair their relationship and the relationships of those under them (Gruen, 1974, 449-460; Hayne, 1994, 31-37).

However, this never eventuated as the two men vied with each other increasingly, unwilling and therefore unable to detach any forces that might come in handy in an ensuing

civil war, between the two. Especially so, since if one despatched a legion to the East, the other might not do the same, and intercept the legion, or at least allow it to change its allegiance from one man to the other (Plut. *Pomp*. 56; *Caes*. 29; App. *Civ*. 2. 29. 114-115; Dio 40. 65. 2 – 40. 66. 1). As a result, Pompey undermined Caesar's standing repeatedly and consistently, while directing public policy in Rome to his own liking (Sanderson, 1971, 46-47). Thus, as Nobbs indicates, 'the man who had always played the 'extraordinary' (in the Latin sense) role was starting to appear a conservative'. For, he was arguably no longer the revolutionary he once was giving all of his associates an increase in prestige in his and other Romans' eyes. In fact, he was undermining a major one, in the form of Caesar, to the detriment of Caesar's and his own causes – all in the bid to have 'all the factions' in the Senate of the *res-publica* 'look to him'. But this would turn out not to be, for as Nobbs points out, many Romans increasingly looked to Caesar, especially from the surrender of Spain to him at the outset of the civil war that was to follow (Nobbs, 1988, 151-155. See also Brunt, 1971, 143).

In 50BC, the civil war between Pompey and Caesar broke out. Pompey was given commander-in-chief status over all of the senatorial legions, while Caesar had command over his own. The consuls and the Senate confirmed and proclaimed authority against Caesar, in Valerius Maximus' words 'not on Pompey but on his cause', thereby denying Pompey a Crassus-like, ill-fortuned, and ill-omened blank cheque to make war where, and how, he pleased, for whatever cause he felt was strategic to his ambitious purposes. Still, he had supreme command of the armies, and fleets, of Rome, under the Senate's powers, unofficially, if not officially. The Senate steered a middle-course, appeasing the young who clamoured for adventure and war, and the older generations who wanted to side with the prestige of Pompey, not Pompey himself. In effect, he was a Pacorus, with the Senate's generals monitoring him, like Orodes II and Osaces (Vell. Pat. 2. 49. 2-3; Val. Max. 49. 3; Dio 41. 39. 4). Thus, as Alföldy puts it, the struggle for power 'impinged upon the political', whereby battles acted as virtual proscriptions throughout the empire (Alföldy, 1988, 85).

CIVIL WAR

At this point the Parthian economy was thriving, but Orodes II increased inflation by minting countless coins, which decreased the value of the Parthian currency, opening up its markets to foreign traders and their products. Of course, the Parthian king overstruck his previous rival for the throne's coins – those of his brother Mithridates (not to be confused with Mithridates VI of Pontus) – with his own portraiture. He increased the number of coins bearing the legend 'Son of Phraates' (ΥΙΟΥ ΦΡΑΑΤΟΥ), thus enhancing his royal status, and legitimising and consolidating his hold on power throughout the entire empire. However, this also caused unemployment throughout the Parthian Empire. But, that made employment within and throughout Parthia's armed forces more attractive, and lucrative, and at the very same time, it depleted Rome, and its empire, of much wealth from the East, as well as goods like Parthian iron and steel (much of which was imported from India) which were used for military purposes, thus exacerbating conditions throughout Roman politics, society, and the Roman military machine. Thus, it served many beneficial purposes for Parthia, while allowing Parthia to further develop *stasis* and civil discord among the Romans for Parthia's

own protection, and imperialist interests. Other interferences in Roman politics were to follow (Pl. *NH*. 34. 145; Wroth 1903: 66, no. 41; Dressel, 1922, 156-177, esp. 159; Colledge, 1967, 37, 43; Sellwood, 1983, 290; Kurz, 1983, 560).

Just before Pharsalus, Caesar had to pass laws in Rome to stop hoarding among debtors, and help creditors who were losing profits from interest repayments of up to twenty-five percent. To restimulate the Roman economy after the civil war, Caesar even had to add value to the Roman currency and trade-market by introducing gold coinage. Orodes II's ruses worked, and the Roman Empire was weakened, and a Parthian War was averted, for the time being. Although, his ruses were noticed by Caesar, who was enraged at him, and sought to replenish Roman coffers and add a neat stimulus-package to the Roman economy arising from plunder, and wealth, from the East in an envisioned invasion under the general (Scullard, 1982, 137, 144). Meanwhile, Parthian armies were encamped throughout eastern Roman territories, just west of the main recognised frontier zones. To modern historian Sheldon, Cicero's use of espionage seems poor at this point – but, although Parthia wanted war, it could not find a suitable pretext for a war, so it resorted to large and small scale raids to provoke Cassius, Bibulus, and Cicero to unjustly attack them. Whereupon, Orodes II and Pacorus, and their armies, would declare war, and counter-attack, as Roman conditions grew worse, and worse (Sheldon, 2010, 55-56).

However, the Romans could play the game of machinations, too. Soon afterwards, numerous Parthian satraps became impatient with Orodes II and Pacorus, and wanted war with Rome immediately. But, because that war was not openly forthcoming, they planned an open revolt – the seeds of which were planted just after Pacorus' previous withdrawal, no doubt with Roman connivance, and approval. In order to bring shame upon those who had shamed Parthia's armies, after its already humiliating defeat at the hands of Cassius, plots were hatched to replace Orodes II with his son, Pacorus. Meanwhile, the ambitious Pacorus was in Syria with an army, waiting to strike, in any direction. Orodes II had no choice, but every reason, to recall Pacorus and the armies under his overarching command, and commanded him and his armies to brutally quash the satraps and their armies, united or separately, which he and they ruthlessly did (Dio 40. 30; Justin 42. 4. 5; Debevoise, 1938, 103-104).

Very soon, Caesar crossed the Rubicon with his armies. Pompey, the consuls, and the majority of Rome's senators withdrew themselves, and many soldiers, from Rome, then Italy, leaving garrisons in towns and cities behind. They arrived in Dyrrachium (Vell. Pat. 2. 49. 4; Val. Max. 49. 4; Jos. *JB*. 1. 183; *JA*. 14. 143; Flor. *Epit*. 2. 13. 18-21; Dio 41. 9. 7 – 41. 10. 3). Caesar took his time crossing his forces into Italy. For the meantime, he struck with a concentrated force of one legion, plus auxiliary troops, and cavalry, burning his way down the eastern Italian sea-board, dispelling opposition scattered among city to city, and town to town. True, these forces could unite for a single, decisive battle, but Caesar's elite crack-force was too experienced, and too potent, to be drawn into a battle in Italy that they may have won anyway, when they could simply defeat each segment of the entire Pompeian force in Italy piecemeal, and thus spare themselves from the besmirching reputation of having been ambitious for full-scale civil war on Rome's doorstep (Syme, 1939, 49). According to Valerius Maximus, Caesar then announced he had now 'resolved to march on Spain', not

Dyrrachium, or the East (Val. Max. 50. 2-4). Marcus Antonius (Mark Antony) was left behind in Italy, to consolidate Caesar's influence, power, and position there (Scullard, 1982, 135). He arrived in Spain, not altogether unexpectedly, but suddenly nonetheless, and without much warning. Afranius, an ex-consul, and Petreius, an ex-praetor, surrendered Spain and its armies there to Caesar, on the condition they not be 'compelled to join his [Caesar's] expedition against Pompey', to quote Severan historian Cassius Dio (Dio 41. 23. 1; Scullard 1982: 136). In time, he would take many soldiers from those armies to Dyrrachium, and Pharsalus, and use them to win the civil war against Pompey. Their loyalty was to Caesar, not Pompey, who had previously only ruled Spain through his lieutenants, and who had mostly commanded and conquered in the East, many years before (Vell. Pat. 2. 50. 4; Val. Max. 2. 50. 2-4; Flor. *Epit*. 2. 13. 26-29).

It was at this point, that Pompey summoned officers and soldiers, including cavalry, from the eastern provinces, and from satellite states – including, no doubt, many of Orodes II's own western provinces, which were famous for their cavalry. Pompey's conquests in the East, although not entirely permanent in cases, brought him much *clientele*, and much wealth, in the form of tribute, and other gifts. With such wealth, Pompey was able to distribute many large loans, both to cities and to individuals, allowing him, in the words of Peter Green, to practically hold 'the gorgeous East in fee' (Green, 1990, 661).

However, the civil war brought with it a conundrum which will now be explained using basic historical, forthright argumentation – Pompey had to pay his vast force, including the officers and soldiers from Orodes II's domains. The number of men at his disposal was immense, and he had to pay them all handsomely so they would not defect to Caesar. His massive loan payouts meant that he was increasingly in arrears, and the number of his men, including senators, dictated that his vast wealth had to be consistently spent on them, from the outset, at incredibly large amounts. Of course, had he reduced his forces at Dyrrachium, and kept other forces in reserve to the East under trusted officers (who, since they would not be in the front-line would need to be paid less), the torrent of the funds he spent would at least have been reduced to a river or a stream, thus stabilising, or even reducing, inflation. Plus, he would have been able to pay them, and sustain them, for longer, making his war-effort more sustainable economically, allowing him and others much more time to buy, and produce, his product: the Pompeian war machine. Had bulk paying been decreased, even slightly, Pompey's military campaign could have been extended, even for much, much longer – with variations here and there over time to suit the developing conditions. As it was, because he paid out over-extended sums of money to maintain his army, and fleet, between Dyrrachium and Pharsalus, many on Pompey's side were now heavily in debt. Thus, Pompey was in a hurry to finish off the war to replenish his and their coffers – whereas, Caesar was in no such hurry, but with calculated acumen he was able to defeat a panicked Pompey by a lure and destroy approach leading up to, and during, the Battle of Pharsalus (Caes. *Civ*. 3. 79. 4; 3. 82. 3 – 3. 83. 4; Cic. *Fam*. 7. 3. 2; *Phil*. 2. 39; Plut. *Cic*. 38; Seager, 2002, 166; Badian, 1968, 78-81; Sherwin-White, 1984, 207-208; Green, 1990, 659-661).

However, in the meantime, the vast amounts Pompey spent increased inflation, making the eastern provinces awash with cash which, owing to its surplus, reduced its rarity, and hence, value. Pompey resorted to taxing the eastern provinces, and his soldiers, heavily. This made

him increasingly unpopular among them (Caes. *Civ*. 3. 31-33; 3. 102-103; Sartre, 2005, 50). Orodes II may have favoured Pompey, but Pompey's reckless spending meant that the eastern provinces, and his forces within and throughout them, were in recession, which may mean that many soldiers inevitably defected to Caesar, anyway. Meanwhile, in the west Caesar had accrued Spain which meant an increase in manpower and wealth – to pay his smaller and more loyal army, with less money needed, to be sure, but that money was worth more than Pompey's, nonetheless. Thus, the inflation in the eastern provinces did not as negatively influence Caesar's western provinces as it did Pompey's eastern ones. Pompey may have emulated Orodes II in his increase in inflation upon the crafty advice of the Parthian 'King of kings' – ostensibly to counter and undermine Caesar's own independent Roman economy to the west – but, in the main, it served to undermine Pompey's own position. As it transpired, the Roman military eventually was not as well-provisioned, and hence not as high in terms of morale, in the east as it was in the west under Caesar. However, Orodes II might have been very, very satisfied indeed, that an invasion of Parthian lands by Pompey was, at least for the foreseeable future, thwarted. For, for some years, even though a number of Roman senators opposed the idea, many people in the eastern provinces and the Parthian Empire expected, perhaps with inside knowledge, that Pompey had been preparing to invade Parthian territories as an enemy, and as a conqueror (Cic. *Att*. 5. 18. 1; 6. 1. 3, 14; Seager, 2002, 143). Therefore, this civil war, which was also an economic civil war, between many Romans, was also very much an economic foreign war as well, with hostilities and cessations between Romans and Parthians, being created through, and with, the use of Parthian and Roman currencies as weapons (Vell. Pat. 2. 51. 1-2; Val. Max. 2. 41. 1-2).

Cicero joined Pompey from the East. According to Scullard, besides the massive numbers of his auxiliary reinforcements, Pompey at this point had 36,000 legionaries. He also had over 300 warships and 200 senators, in his hands. However, these were not always united under Pompey's anti-Caesar command (Scullard, 1982, 137). Pompey had mustered a huge fleet to retake Italy and Spain, and blockaded the Adriatic Sea to bar Caesar, his fleet, and his officers and soldiers, from landing near Dyrrachium. This depleted the fleet of strike power against Italy and Spain, but as he had done in Italy, Pompey made sure there were garrisons in the Adriatic to cause Caesar much havoc, in the form of ships – while he mustered more ships, for the likely future invasion, and re-taking, of Italy and Spain for himself, and the Senate. Caesar had to act fast to stop Pompey's war-fleet and transport vessels growing in number, so that Pompey would not retake Italy, and then Spain, and cut Caesar off from valuable manpower and wealth resources. If such was to eventuate, Caesar would then be pent-up in Gaul, and surrounded by Pompey who would have had command of much of the Roman World, and its multiple resources, including human. Strategically, Caesar's concentrated fleet broke through the sporadically, but strategically situated warships of Pompey's, and made landfall near Dyrrachium, and there he disembarked his forces. There, they pitched camps, and then laid siege to Pompey's forces around, and in, Dyrrachium – as Pacorus and Osaces had done to Cassius, and his forces, at Antioch. But, Caesar had the intention to win (Caes. *Civ*. 3. 2-7; Liv. 110; Vell. Pat. 2. 51. 1-2; Val. Max. 2. 41. 1-2; Luc. *Phars*. 1. 1; Flor. *Epit*. 2. 13. 39, 47; App. *Civ*. 2. 7. 47; Dio 41. 10. 4; 41. 15. 1; 41. 44. 2-3; 41. 47. 1; 41. 50. 1; Scullard, 1982, 135, 137).

After Carrhae, Rome's upper echelons in its military realised the need to assimilate Parthian military approaches, and tactics. Kurz argues they did this through intelligence gathering through prisoners of war, and auxiliaries enlisted during the civil war between Pompey and Caesar – which they did. However, Roman commanders, officers, and soldiers were obviously also on the ground at key battles and skirmishes too, so those echelons no doubt received much of their information from them as well, implementing them according to Roman, not Parthian, practices (Kurz, 1983, 561). It was around this time that the people of Cordova in Spain, and two legions in Spain, deserted Caesar and gave their allegiance to Pompey. This resembled how many of Rome's soldiers had defected to the Parthian side following Carrhae, especially before Cicero's intervention in the East, and Cassius' military victory against Pacorus and Osaces – and as when Orodes II's satraps rebelled in Pacorus' rear, while Pacorus was much closer to the war-front – which Pacorus put down ruthlessly. No doubt these conditions in Spain were exacerbated with Pompey's help, and Parthian connivance (Caes. *Civ*. 3. 2-7; Liv. 110; Dio 41. 15. 1 – 41. 25. 3). Thus, with Pompey to the east, Caesar's rear was now exposed to the west – a knotted situation that would take him years to unravel and re-bind in an orderly fashion to his liking (Syme, 1939, 50). Therefore, what began in Rome, and then in Italy, spread throughout the provinces of the Roman Empire, influencing an inestimable number of people abroad (Flor. *Epit*. 2. 13. 3-6).

PHARSALUS AND ITS AFTERMATH

It was at this point, that Caesar's supply chains were cut off by Pompey, perhaps as Cassius and Cicero had previously done to the Parthian hosts before Antioch (Liv. 111; Vell. Pat. 2. 51. 2; Val. Max. 41. 3; Flor. *Epit*. 2. 13. 42; Dio 41. 51. 4). Pompey stormed Caesar's camps at Dyrrachium, and penetrated their fortifications and siege-works, whereupon Caesar's soldiers suffered heavily (Caes. *Civ*. 3. 30-99; Liv. 111; Vell. Pat. 2. 51. 3). Caesar lifted his siege of Dyrrachium and Pompey's forces, and feigned retreat, as Pacorus and Osaces had done, and withdrew into Thessaly, for a true battle against his Cassius – Pompey – but this time, Caesar would make sure he would win. Pompey, buoyed like Cassius was, pursued Caesar, espousing he had won the war and assuming the title of *imperator*, no doubt in the express hope of winning in a decisive battle against Caesar – his Pacorus and Osaces. But, Pompey's advisers implored him to keep cutting off Caesars' supply lines and take Italy, or at least slow his pursuit and think more clearly, using more time for reflection and inspiration. Pompey refused their advice, and his armies began to engage the enemy in parts, not as a united battle-front, and in the main, carried off victories, unexpectedly to Caesar. Then, Caesar lured Pompey into a decisive battle at Pharsalus, with his men seeking vengeance for Dyrrachium and their losses at these engagements, and on the 9th of August 48BC, Caesar and his officers and soldiers defeated Pompey, resoundingly (Caes. *Civ*. 3. 30-99; Liv. 111; Vell. Pat. 2. 52. 1-6; Val. Max. 42. 1-3; Flor. *Epit*. 2. 13. 44-51; Dio 41. 51. 1 – 41. 61. 5).

In the aftermath, Cicero was placed under house arrest, and kept in custody, in Pompey's main camp, for duplicity and sedition against Caesar, and his cause (Liv. 111; Plut. *Cic*. 38-40). Pompey was advised to seek refuge, and regroup, with the Parthians. Instead, he decided to do so in Egypt, closer to the main recent theatre of war. There, he was stabbed to death on

the eve of his birthday, aged fifty-eight. Pharnaces was captured quickly, and killed, in 47BC. In that same year, Caecilius Bassus, an officer of Pompey's of the equestrian (*equites*) class, fomented rebellion in Syria, no doubt with Parthian help using stragglers of Pharnaces', who had remembered his and Pompey's swift dealing with Mithridates, and Pompey's own handling of eastern territories relating to invasion and conquest. A Roman legion stationed in Syria deserted to him (Cic. *Fam*. 12. 18. 1; Liv. 113-114; Vell. Pat. 2. 53. 1-3; 2. 55. 2; Flor. *Epit*. 2. 13. 51-52; 2. 13. 61-63; App. *Civ*. 3. 11. 17; 4. 8. 58; Dio 46. 26. 3-7; 47. 2. 4 – 47. 4. 5; 47. 47. 5; Seager, 2002, 167-168). Caesar settled affairs in Syria, and the other eastern provinces and territories of Rome, to his liking, including by forming alliances with satellite states, including Judea, strengthening it for Rome, and Rome's purposes – not to mention Caesar's – by fortifying Jerusalem, and other cities and towns throughout Judea, and elsewhere. This safeguarded the eastern frontier against Parthian incursions, and further episodes of civil unrest. Meanwhile, Caesar was able to play rulers off against each other to his liking, such as Antipater and Hyrcanus in Judea, until only Antipater and his son Herod 'the Great' remained in total power over Judea – under Roman suzerainty, of course, with Caesar at its head, as well as his successors (Jos. *JB*. 1. 187-216; *JA*. 14. 186-267). This reversed the Jewish tactic up until that point of playing Romans off against Parthians, and *vice versa*, in the power vacuum that presented itself after Carrhae when the eastern provinces of the Romans were suddenly devoid of many of their troops. Instead, Caesar was now playing Jews off against each other, Parthians off against each other, and Jews and Parthians off against each other, as well (Bivar, 1983, 56).

BUILD UP TO CAESAR'S ASSASSINATION

Caesar celebrated four triumphs in 46BC over Gaul, Pontus, Egypt, and Africa. But, then he showed he wanted more conquests and triumphs when, he conquered Spain, victorious in the decisive battle near the city of Munda, on 17th March 45BC. In 45BC, he celebrated a triumph over Spain (Liv. 115; Caes. *Spanish War*; Liv. 115; Vell. Pat. 2. 55. 2 – 2. 56. 3; Val. Max. 56. 2; Plut. *Caes*. 55; Suet. *Caes*. 37-39; Flor. *Epit*. 2. 13. 73-89; App. *Civ*. 2. 15. 101-106; Dio 43. 19. 1-4; 43. 28. 1 – 43. 40. 2). A Sibylline prophecy began circulating that only a Roman king (*rex*) could ever conquer the Parthian Empire. Caesar was invested with the title of *imperator* – a title that indicated war had come to a close, and that he was himself victorious – and was crowned by Marcus Antonius outside the temple of Mother Venus, in Rome at the Roman Lupercalia festival on 15th February 44BC (Plut. *Ant*. 12). Antonius and Caesar conspired to do this, testing the cheering crowds. Southern posits, had the crowds and senators cheered louder, Caesar might have claimed kingship, right there and then (Southern, 2010, 83). However, this was observed by certain disgruntled senators, who thereupon offered to Caesar various distinctions, half-heartedly. But, Caesar refused to even stand for them, and placed his crown on a chair right in front of their disappointed, and insulted, observing eyes – though monarchy was still viewed unfavourably at times by many of Rome's senators – even if Caesar had desired to be a Roman king, and a Parthian 'King of kings', himself (Liv. 116; Plut. *Caes*. 60-63; Suet. *Caes*. 78-80; Dio 43. 44. 1-11; Canfora, 2007, 281-285; Billows, 2009, 248).

The title 'Dictator for Life' – voted upon him by the Senate – sufficed for the time being, though, for Caesar was experimenting with his options while setting a course through largely unchartered seas (Syme, 1939, 55; Scullard, 1982, 151; Billows, 2009, 248). In public, Caesar showed covert signs he wanted to become king, but overtly he replied to questions about kingship, and offers of it, with caution, and veiled tact – although, rule by a Senate without an emperor might have seemed to Caesar an absurdity, isolating many senators as something of an anachronistic curiosity to Caesar (Plut. *Caes*. 60; Suet. *Caes*. 79; Syme 1939: 55, 59). Most certainly, Cicero had said and written on occasion that the *status quo* of the *res-publica* had broken down and was nearly destroyed (Cic. *Quint*. 1. 2. 15; Suet. *Caes*. 30; Alföldy, 1988, 92; Flower, 2010, 152). Indeed, as Sanderson presents, 'the *patres* could not preserve untouched the *modus operandi* of a former era' – and, while Caesar knew that while a Parthian War would remove him from the centre of power in Rome, it would also 'encourage' his 'rise' further, and further (Sanderson, 1971, 23-24).

It was bound to happen, perhaps inevitable, that Caesar would, as Alföldy asserts, 'thrust aside all rivals' and provide Rome with a new 'political framework' and 'ideological orientation', while marching along the roads that led to it armed with increasing sense of 'autocracy', and arguably, an increased sense of fascism and imperialism, potentially leading to a more imperial, emperor-like kingship – designed to be implemented by Caesar, himself (Alföldy, 1988, 93). Syme held Caesar was thrust into the position of considering kingship status, owing to the breakdown of the state during and after the civil war (Syme, 1985, 119-123), while Hoyos posits that Caesar's own success was so breathtaking that it was irresistible – even to the point of sovereign – annihilating the traditional, political, Roman *status quo* (Hoyos, 1979, 134-157). In any event, it would have been very interesting to see what Caesar would have done in Rome, after he had conquered the East as its new 'King of kings'. No doubt, his time away from Rome would have diverted attention away from his monarchical hopes and aims, but his eventual return would have spelled irresistible and immediate conferment of the title of royal ruler upon the all-victorious and all-powerful general (Syme, 1985, 123). For, as Ball has put it, when Rome conquered its eastern provinces, and settled them, 'the eastern concept of empire conquered Rome', especially Caesar, who as autocrat styled himself as king and emperor – in effect, if not titulature (Ball, 2000, 10).

Oaths of allegiance were sworn to Caesar, his health, and to his party, throughout some parts of the empire, as a build-up to a more empire-wide swearing of loyalty to Caesar as apex patron, under which the entire population would act as his *clientela*. Syme argued this might have been the beginnings of Caesar's reordering of the Roman constitution. Perhaps also, it might be argued, it was to safeguard his rear, at home throughout the Roman Empire, while he was away on extended campaign with many of Rome's legions and auxiliaries to the east, throughout the hostile Parthian Empire, and even beyond (Suet. *Caes*. 84; App. *Civ*. 2. 145, 604; Syme, 1939, 52). Most certainly, as Sanderson points out, the Senate had been largely unsuccessful in steering politics away from escalation into civil war, so arguably Caesar saw, and used, this opportunity to succeed where others had failed (Sanderson, 1971, 46-47. See also Boak, 1918/1919, 1-25; Sherwin-White, 1959, 1-9). In other words, this seemed to Caesar and his supporters to be one approach, with its (at this point) partially implemented methods to solve the problem of what Alföldy terms the 'upheaval in the Late

Republic… of its strata' of divided patronage and *clientela*, especially between Caesar on the one hand and Pompey on the other. By these means, Caesar attempted to foster pro-Caesarean 'ideals' to check future civil unrest and civil wars (Alföldy, 1988, 89, 92). But, upon this humiliating Lupercalian episode for these eminent Roman senators, a plot was hatched against Caesar, with Marcus Junius Brutus, and the same Cassius who had survived Carrhae and defeated the Parthians in battle outside Antioch, as the main ringleaders (Liv. 116; Vell. Pat. 2. 56. 3-4; 2. 57. 2; Plut. *Caes*. 63-66; Suet. *Caes*. 80-82; Flor. *Epit*. 2. 13. 91-93; App. *Civ*. 2. 16. 111-117; Dio 43. 44. 13-14; Bivar, 1983, 55).

Although some modern historians have debated the possibility, for some time, it appears Caesar had chosen the East for his next theatre of operations (Sykes, 1951, 355; Brunt, 1990, 450-451; Sheldon, 2010, 57-57). He had Parthia in his sights, but he had no pretext, except Crassus' loss. This may have made him very Crassus-like in many Romans' eyes, and therefore susceptible and vulnerable to Parthian attack, and machinations, both in Parthian territory, and in Roman territory, including in Rome itself. This could have meant disaster, both for him, and for Rome. Still, he pressed on for his campaign, and many Romans were seething for blood in the form of revenge following Crassus' defeat at Carrhae. Cicero was among them, and many other senators and equestrians, voicing their approval publically, although their sentiments in private may have been somewhat eschewed to this official message (Cic. *Att*. 13. 27). Most certainly, many senators believed it was their birthright and political right to exercise their own form of power in official office, and through unofficial influence, sanctioned by the state, and Cicero voiced this to Caesar as a warning that if all-victorious and all-powerful, this may garner a response from the rest of the senators – one which may be unpalatable, and distasteful, to Caesar and to his closest supporters (Cic. *Pro Marc*. 3. 9-17; Everitt, 2003, 247).

Besides, a foreign war was preferable to another civil war. In order to maintain his popularity, and political position, and sustain his life, Caesar needed to divert minds from his reputation as a civil war general to a true Roman general – one that commanded armies abroad to fight, and conquer hostile foreign kingdoms, and empires. Thus, what was initially vengeance for Carrhae to Caesar, became a means and an end for political, and military, survival, relevance, and ultimately, power (Billows, 2009, 246). The East was a convenient theatre of military operations for Caesar, because it also evoked the glories of the conquests of Alexander 'the Great' in many Romans' minds. Besides, Alexander was a European king who, in effect, became a 'King of kings' over the Persian Empire. To a very great extent, the Parthian Empire was its successor, having wrestled control of much of the Middle East from the Macedonian Seleucid dynasty – the heirs of Alexander from Syria to India (roughly the same territory conquered and controlled by the ruling Arsacid dynasty over the Parthian Empire) (Fuller, 1998, 300). However, like Alexander, Caesar did not just aim to conquer this area. According to Plutarch, Caesar planned to conquer all the coasts and inland areas around the Black Sea, then conquer west along the Danube, extending Roman power to the south and north of it, then capture Germany, and then return to Rome in glory through Gaul, marching in splendorous procession along the way, before celebrating a magnificent triumph-to-end-all-triumphs through the main thoroughfares of the city of Rome, with his armies and prisoners of war, and captured treasures (Plut. *Caes*. 58).

Caesar mobilised and mustered sixteen legions, and many other troops, for the invasion, including ten thousand soldiers in the main cavalry arm of his forces. He planned to march these through the hilly country of Armenia, and then down onto the windswept plains of Mesopotamia, Babylonia, and Adiabene, between and beyond the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. He also planned to conscript forces, including more cavalry, especially from Armenia, along the way – all the while observing, taking notes, and reflecting on latest Parthian tactics, in the hope of countering as many of them as possible successfully, while playing to his strengths. These forces were sent ahead to muster in Macedonia, from where they were to be transported east, to march on Armenia, and then the Parthian Empire (Suet. *Caes*. 44; Fuller, 1998, 300).

But, in the lead up to his embarkation for his Parthian War, during his stay in Rome since October 45BC – a war that would no doubt have deserved and received a written account by Caesar and his officers – soothsayers throughout Rome had warned Caesar to 'beware the Ides of March'. Calpurnia, his wife, was terrified by a dream, and 'kept begging him to remain at home on that day'. But, Caesar kept saying, according to Tiberian historian Valerius Maximus, he 'would rather die than live in fear' (Vell. Pat. 2. 56. 3; Val. Max. 57. 2; Flor. *Epit*. 2. 13. 94-95). After his assassination by stabbing in Pompey's Theatre, which acted as a Senate House on that day, very conveniently indeed, on the Ides of March, Caesar's will was opened, 'by which' as Valerius Maximus states 'he adopted Gaius Octavius, the grandson of his sister Julia' (Val. Max. 59. 1). It was opened, proclaimed, and ratified, by the Senate in a meeting convened by one of the consuls of that year, Antonius. A new era had dawned, and Octavian – the future Augustus – would not make war on Parthia, without pretext. For he never did, even when he tried to, with or without pretext, on as full a scale as Crassus and Caesar might have envisaged, and encouraged, him to do (Nicolaus of Damascus, *Life of Caesar*, 13, 17; Liv. 116; Vell. Pat. 2. 58. 2; 2. 59. 1; Val. Max. 59. 1; Pl. *NH*. 35. 7. 21; Suet. *Caes*. 83; App. *Civ*. 3. 1. 10-15; Dio 43. 38. 1-2; 44. 19. 4-5, Syme, 1939, 98; Southern, 2010, 90-92).

CONCLUSION

There are many lessons to learn from Romano-Parthian relations from Carrhae to the end of Julius Caesar's life. Provided one places each ancient Roman and Parthian personality, and their words and actions, within the wider historical context of events, customs and behaviours, one can apply many lessons from this past period of upheaval and peace to the present, and the future. This article advocates that it is when one appreciates that historical figures were once living, breathing individuals, with thoughts and feelings, and that they lived and moved in a world and times unlike our own, but similar in many ways, one becomes a greater empathiser towards key figures, republics, and empires. Whilst total understanding is something that is often sought for but never entirely achieved, one can still gain a perceptive comprehension of conditions on the ground in the period covered by this article, thanks to this article. When one searches through the evidence and arguments presented throughout the entirety of this article, and pierces through each with one's mind and heart to see the truth, and value, in each, one comprehends the true value of studying the Ancient World. The personalities and events contained in this article are historical case

studies, verified by the finest ancient historians. May they inform the present of the past, and inform our futures in more peaceful, collaborating, corroborating, and sustainable ways – as individuals, as groups of individuals, and as one synthesised humanity crossing group boundaries as healthy, informed persons. May we do so in order to learn from the past, play to our strengths, minimise our weaknesses, emulate the successes of the past, and not repeat what history condemns. For, history is a reflection of human beings, and the mirror we hold up to see that reflection is every historical writing or oral story. Sometimes those mirrors are true, but sometimes they are tainted. This article has been designed to be a true mirror, to show a true reflection. But, may it be said, the characters in this article may very well not be like the reader. In which case, the reflection is of those individuals of the past. However, as human beings, we share some common traits. May we each channel our traits, whatever they are, whether unique or otherwise, into creative paths, to help make this world more stable, balanced, and healthy, for humankind to live on – and thrive upon.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alföldy, G. (1988). *The Social History of Rome.* London: Routledge.

Badian, E. (1968). *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic.* New York: Cornell University Press.

Ball, W. (2000). *Rome in the East: The Transformation of an Empire.* London: Routledge.

Bellemore, J. (1999). Josephus, Pompey and the Jews. *Historia*, 48, 94-118.

Billows, R. (2009). *Julius Caesar: Colossus of Rome.* London: Routledge.

Bivar, A. D. H. (1983). "The Political History of Iran Under the Arsacids". E. Yarshater, ed., *The Cambridge History of Iran. Volume 3 (1): The Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian Periods.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 21-99.

Boak, A. E. R. (1918/1919). The Extraordinary Commands from 80 to 48 BC: A Study in the Origins of the Principate. *American Historical Review*, 24, 1-25.

Brunt, P. A. (1971). *Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic.* New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Brunt, P. A. (1990). "Roman Imperial Illusions". P. A. Brunt, ed., *Roman Imperial Themes.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 433-480.

Canfora, L. (2007). *Julius Caesar: The Life and Times of the People's Dictator.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Colledge, M. A. R. (1967). *The Parthians*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

Debevoise, N. (1938). *The Political History of Parthia.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dressel, H. (1922). Ein Tetradrachmon des Arsakiden Mithridates III. *Zeitschrift für Numismatik*, 33, 156-177.

Everitt, A. (2003). *Cicero: The Life and Times of Rome's Greatest Politician.* New York: Random House.

Flower, H. I. (2010). *Roman Republics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Freeman, P. (2008). *Julius Caesar*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Fuller, J. (1998). *Julius Caesar: Man, Soldier and Tyrant.* Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Ware.

Green, P. (1990). *Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gruen, E. S. (1974). *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hayne, L. (1994). Caesar and Pompey. *Ancient History: Resources for Teachers,* 24 (1), 31-37.

Hoyos, D. (1979). Imperial Caesar? *Ancient History: Resources for Teachers*, 9 (3), 134-157.

Kurz,O. (1983). "Cultural Relations Between Parthia and Rome". E. Yarshater, ed., *The Cambridge History of Iran. Volume 3 (1): The Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian Periods.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 559-567.

Lerouge, C. (2007). *L'image des Parthes dans le monde gréco-romain.* Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.

Mankin, D. (1995). *Horace: Epodes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nobbs, A. (1988). The Career of Pompey. *Ancient History: Resources for Teachers*, 18 (3), 151-155.

Sampson, G. C. (2008). *The Defeat of Rome: Crassus, Carrhae and the Invasion of the East.* Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military.

Sanderson, V. (1971). The Great Commands of the First Century BC. *Ancient Society*, 1 (4), 54-72.

Sartre, M. (1979). Rome et les Nabatéens à la fin de la République. *Revue des études anciennes*, 81, 37-53.

Sartre, M. (2005). *The Middle East Under Rome*. London: Belknap Press.

Scullard, H. H. (1982). *From the Gracchi to Nero: A History of Rome 133BC to AD68*. Fifth Edition. London: Routledge.

Seager, R. (2002). *Pompey the Great*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Sellwood, D. (1971). "Some Politic Alterations in the Parthian Series". R. A. G. Carson, ed., *Mints, Dies and Currency: Essays in Memory of Albert Baldwin.* London: Methuen & Co, 34-40.

Sellwood, D. (1983). "Parthian Coins". E. Yarshater, ed., *The Cambridge History of Iran. Volume 3 (1): The Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian Periods.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 279-298.

Shabazi, S. (1987). "Army I. Pre-Islamic Iran". *Encyclopedia Iranica.* London: Centre for Iranian Studies. Vol 2, pp. 489-490.

Sheldon, R. M. (2010). *Rome's Wars in Parthia: Blood in the Sand.* London: Vallentine Mitchell.

Sherwin-White, A. N. (1959). Violence in Roman Politics. *Journal of Roman Studies*, 46, 1-9.

Sherwin-White, A. N. (1984). *Roman Foreign Policy in the East 168 BC to AD 1*. London: Duckworth.

Southern, P. (2010). *Mark Antony: A Life*. Stroud: Amberley.

Sykes, P. M. (1951). *History of Persia*. London: Macmillan.

Syme, R. (1939). *The Roman Revolution.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Syme, R. (1985). Caesar: Drama, Legend, History. *Ancient History: Resources for Teachers*, 15 (3), 119-123.

Tarn, W. W. (1975). *Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments.* Chicago: Ares Press.

Wheeler, E. L. 1997. "Why the Romans Can't Defeat the Parthians: Julius Africanus and the Strategy of Magic". W. Groenman-Van Waateringe, B. L. Van Beek, W. J. H. Williams, S. L. Wynia, eds., *Roman Frontier Studies, 1995.* Oxbrow Monograph 91. Oxford. Oxford University Press, 575-579.

Wroth, W. (1903). *A Catalogue of Greek Coins in the British Museum: Parthia.* London.