Post-Quantum Readiness for Federated Identity and API Platforms: Migrating TLS, JWT Signing, KMS, and Encrypted Persona Identifiers without Breaking Oauth/OIDC Flows

Authors

  • Sailesh Kotha
  • Rajesh Babu Kodali

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.47941/jts.4118

Keywords:

Post-Quantum Cryptography, OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect, JSON Web Token, TLS, Key Management, Hybrid Key Exchange, ML-KEM, ML-DSA, Federated Identity, Crypto-Agility

Abstract

Purpose: This paper develops a layered framework that lets federated identity and API platforms built on OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect adopt post-quantum cryptography without breaking existing OAuth/OIDC flows.

Methodology: The paper synthesizes standards, vendor announcements and research available through June 30, 2026, including NIST's August 2024 standards (ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA) and hybrid specifications from the IETF, the OpenID Foundation and major cloud providers. It presents a reference architecture spanning TLS transport, JWT signing, key custody and encrypted persona identifiers, a per-layer migration lever taxonomy, three illustrative use cases and a qualitative comparison of staged and single cutover migration.

Findings:  Data protected by classical key exchange is already exposed to harvest now, decrypt later attacks. OAuth/OIDC flows can break when the layers are not coordinated, for example when relying parties cannot parse unfamiliar JSON Web Key Set entries, when middleboxes reject the larger hybrid TLS ClientHello, or when stored identifiers are re-encrypted without a rotation plan. Because several required specifications were still Internet-Drafts in June 2026, a staged, hybrid, crypto-agile approach is preferable to a single cutover.

Unique Contribution to Theory, Policy and Practice: The paper treats the four layers as coordinated migration surfaces rather than independent projects; gives platform teams a lever taxonomy, a catalogue of breakage points and a persona identifier migration pattern; and supports policies that prioritize confidentiality-sensitive layers and hybrid, dual-stack designs while standards mature.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

[1] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "NIST Releases First 3 Finalized Post-Quantum Encryption Standards," Aug. 13, 2024.

[2] Federal Register, "Announcing Issuance of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) FIPS 203, FIPS 204, and FIPS 205," Aug. 14, 2024.

[3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "NIST Selects HQC as Fifth Algorithm for Post-Quantum Encryption," Mar. 11, 2025.

[4] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Computer Security Division, "FIPS 206: FN-DSA (Falcon)," NIST CSRC presentation and status update, 2025.

[5] M. Mosca, "Cybersecurity in an Era with Quantum Computers: Will We Be Ready?," IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 16, no. 5, pp. 38-41, 2018.

[6] National Security Agency, "Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0," 2022, updated 2024.

[7] D. Stebila, S. Fluhrer, and S. Gueron, "Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3," Internet Engineering Task Force, Internet-Draft draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design, work in progress, 2026.

[8] Internet Engineering Task Force, TLS Working Group, "ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3," Internet-Draft draft-ietf-tls-mlkem, work in progress, 2026.

[9] Google Security Blog, "Advancing Our Amazing Bet on Asymmetric Cryptography," May 23, 2024.

[10] Cloudflare Blog, "Cloudflare now uses post-quantum cryptography to talk to your origin server," Sept. 29, 2023.

[11] Amazon Web Services, "AWS KMS adds support for post-quantum ML-DSA digital signatures," June 13, 2025.

[12] Amazon Web Services, "AWS Secrets Manager clients now support hybrid post-quantum TLS to protect secrets from quantum risks," Apr. 14, 2026.

[13] Google Cloud Blog, "Announcing quantum-safe Key Encapsulation Mechanisms in Cloud KMS," Oct. 7, 2025.

[14] OpenID Foundation, "Post-Quantum Identity Standards," May 7, 2024.

[15] Internet Engineering Task Force, COSE Working Group, "ML-DSA for JOSE and COSE," RFC 9964, May 2026.

[16] Internet Engineering Task Force, JOSE Working Group, "PQ/T Hybrid Composite Signatures for JOSE and COSE," Internet-Draft draft-ietf-jose-pq-composite-sigs, work in progress, 2026.

[17] Internet Engineering Task Force, LAMPS Working Group, "Composite ML-DSA for use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure," Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs, work in progress, 2026.

[18] Internet Engineering Task Force, LAMPS Working Group, "Composite ML-KEM for use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure," Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-kem, work in progress, 2026.

[19] National Institute of Standards and Technology, National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence, "Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography," NIST Special Publication 1800-38, preliminary draft, Vols. A-C, 2023.

[20] DigiCert (survey conducted by Propeller Insights), "Quantum Readiness Gap: DigiCert Study Finds Just 5% of Enterprises Have Quantum-Safe Encryption in Place," May 8, 2025.

[21] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Status Report on the Fourth Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process," NIST Internal Report 8545, Mar. 2025.

Downloads

Published

2026-11-19

How to Cite

Kotha, S., & Kodali, R. B. (2026). Post-Quantum Readiness for Federated Identity and API Platforms: Migrating TLS, JWT Signing, KMS, and Encrypted Persona Identifiers without Breaking Oauth/OIDC Flows. Journal of Technology and Systems, 8(4), 61–74. https://doi.org/10.47941/jts.4118

Issue

Section

Articles

Similar Articles

1 2 3 4 5 6 > >> 

You may also start an advanced similarity search for this article.